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1  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Securities settlement systems (SSSs) have 
become an important component of the domestic 
and global ﬁ  nancial infrastructure as securities 
markets have become an increasingly important 
channel for the ﬂ  ows of funds between borrowers 
and lenders, and investors have started managing 
their securities portfolios more actively. Thus, 
weaknesses in SSSs can be a source of systemic 
disturbance for securities markets and for other 
payment and settlement systems. 
It is for this reason that the international 
community has increasingly focused on the 
s o u n d n e s s ,  s a f e t y  a n d  r e s i l i e n c e  o f  t h e  p o s t -
trading infrastructure, when assessing the 
strengths and vulnerabilities of the ﬁ  nancial 
markets in various countries. In the ﬁ  eld  of 
payment and settlement systems, the 
internationally recognised standard-setting body 
is the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS) of the central banks of the 
Group of Ten countries1, which, when dealing 
with securities infrastructures, cooperates with 
the Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO). 
In November 2001 and November 2002 
respectively, the CPSS and IOSCO each 
published a report identifying and discussing 
19 recommendations that all SSSs should meet, 
together with the methodology for assessing 
systems against the recommendations. These 
recommendations have been included in the 
“Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems” 
highlighted by the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) and represent a “benchmark” for 
comparing and evaluating the degree of safety 
of SSSs around the world.2 At the same time, 
as the geographical scope of application of the 
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations is worldwide, 
they could not be too stringent and needed to 
b e  g e n e r a l  e n o u g h  t o  b e  u s e d  i n  a  v a ri e ty  o f  
contexts, ranging from the markets of developing 
countries to the infrastructure serving the major 
global  ﬁ   nancial centres. The CPSS-IOSCO 
reports emphasise that the recommendations 
are “minimum standards” (so stricter measures 
may be welcomed and in some cases warranted 
according to the speciﬁ  c environments in which 
the systems operate) and that various aspects 
would need to be further clariﬁ  ed by the relevant 
local authorities before the recommendations are 
implemented. 
The assessment methodology of the CPSS-
IOSCO Recommendations leaves open the 
possibility for the relevant authorities to extend 
the scope of application of the recommendations 
beyond SSSs to other major providers of 
similar services. Securities custody and 
settlement services are offered by various 
categories of intermediary, depending on the 
business practice, legal tradition and history 
of the country concerned.3 As a result, while 
a principle of specialisation generally applies 
to  ﬁ   nancial intermediaries (e.g. banks and 
insurance companies), clearing and settlement 
services for securities can be provided by several 
For this purpose, a framework for cooperation among the  1 
authorities in charge, in their respective countries, of issues 
affecting  ﬁ   nancial stability was set up by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in the form of committees, 
which over the years gradually developed into international 
standard-setting bodies. For further information, see 
http://www.bis.org/stability.htm. A well-known example 
in the banking sector is the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.
For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the  2 
World Bank have a Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP), which includes a detailed report assessing the ﬁ  nancial 
market infrastructure of the member countries against the 
relevant standards and codes (known as the “ROSC”). For 
further information about the program, see the IMF’s website 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fsap.asp#I).
See paragraph 1.10 of the CPSS-IOSCO 2001 recommendations  3 
report: “Because of the diversity of institutional arrangements 
internationally, the recommendations must focus on the 
functions to be performed, not on the institutions that may 
perform them. While some of the recommendations are relevant 
primarily to CSDs, others are relevant to stock exchanges, trade 
associations and other operators of trade conﬁ  rmation systems, 
CCPs, settlement banks or custodians. As noted above, the 
distinctions between the functions of CSDs and custodians 
have become blurred in some markets where custodians settle 
trades between clients on their own books. In such markets 
some of the recommendations addressed to CSDs may need to 
be applied to such custodians. Many are also relevant to the 
broker-dealers, banks, investment managers and investors who 
use the services provided by the above-mentioned institutions. 
Securities regulators, central banks and, in some cases, 
banking supervisors will need to work together to determine 
the appropriate scope of application of the recommendations 
and to develop an action plan for implementation.”5
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I   INTRODUCTION 
AND SUMMARY entities. For example, in most countries special 
entities (central securities depositories, or CSDs) 
have been created to centralise the issuance and 
settlement of securities. In some markets, a major, 
complementary role is played by custodians and 
clearing banks serving other intermediaries 
which do not access the CSD directly (such as in 
the tiered systems in place in the United Kingdom 
and the United States). In some ﬁ  nancial market 
segments with no speciﬁ  c national anchor (such 
as the eurobond market which has developed 
since the 1970s), special entities have been 
created, i.e. the two international central 
securities depositories (ICSDs), Clearstream 
Luxembourg and the Brussels-based Euroclear 
Bank. In other cases, it may be business practice 
for securities settlement to be internalised in the 
books of the banks that hold investors’ securities 
in custody (“custodian banks”), without the need 
f o r  s e t t l e m e n t  i n s t ru c t i o n s  t o  b e  f o rw a r d e d  t o  
th e  l ocal  C S D .  F inall y ,  in  s o m e  co un tri es,  th e 
boundaries between institutions active in this 
ﬁ  eld may be even more blurred, as CSDs may be 
established with banking status. 
Faced with this institutional “melting pot”, the 
CPSS and IOSCO took a functional approach 
when developing the recommendations (i.e. by 
looking at how risks originate in the performance 
of the various functions, irrespective of which 
institution is involved in delivering the service) 
and left their practical implementation in 
the speciﬁ   c markets to the local regulatory 
authorities. 
This is a particularly challenging task for the 
central banks and securities regulators of the 
European Union (EU), and has prompted the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
and the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) to set up a joint working 
group in order to adapt the recommendations 
to the European environment. The European 
context is peculiar in that, following the 
a d o p t i o n  o f  E U  D i r e c t i v e s  b y  t h e  M e m b e r  
States, a signiﬁ   cant degree of harmonisation 
has been achieved in many aspects of the 
banking and ﬁ  nancial sector. However, most of 
the legal and business conditions relevant for 
the securities clearing and settlement industry 
derive from national regulations which are 
not harmonised, and which are the result of 
contrasting – sometimes even opposing – 
national regulatory approaches (ranging, for 
example, from prohibiting CSDs from engaging 
in any credit provision or lending activity to, at 
the other end of the scale, establishing CSDs 
with the legal form of a credit institution). 
In October 2004 this joint effort resulted in the 
publication of a report on standards for 
securities clearing and settlement in the EU.4 
The report was not considered ﬁ  nal, as further 
work was needed to investigate some 
outstanding questions, for example, to what 
extent, if at all, the standards should also apply 
to custodian banks. 
O n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  o b j e c t i o n s  r a i s e d  d u r i n g  t h e  
2004 public consultation concerned the risk 
that the standards developed using a functional 
approach (hence in principle applicable to any 
institution performing clearing and settlement 
functions, irrespective o f whether it is a CSD , 
a bank or any other legal entity) would in fact 
overlap with and duplicate the national and 
international requirements to which speciﬁ  c 
categories of institution are already subject 
in Europe (as regulation was traditionally 
developed taking an institutional approach).5 On 
the other hand, inconsistency between banking 
regulations and oversight recommendations may 
have undesirable effects, for instance in terms 
of competition, by causing a shift of settlement 
“Standards for securities clearing and settlement in the  4 
European Union” (available on the ECB’s website at http://www.
ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/escb-cesr-standardssecurities2004en.
pdf). For information about the follow-up work carried out, 
see the April 2005 issue of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. It 
is envisaged that a revised version of the report will be the 
subject of a public consultation before being ﬁ  nally approved 
for implementation by the ECB’s decision-making bodies and 
CESR.
The main reason why duplicated regulation should be avoided is  5 
that regulation entails compliance costs for the entities subject 
to it, and thus (additional) regulation that is not justiﬁ  ed from 
a  ﬁ   nancial stability perspective would introduce competitive 
advantages or disadvantages for some market players. In turn, 
this alters the efﬁ  ciency of the market mechanism, changes the 
allocation of resources and ultimately potentially drives the sector 
towards less costly and possibly less safe market solutions.6
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from infrastructure to intermediaries. This may, 
in turn, result in increased instability to the 
extent that it would lead to the concentration of 
risks stemming from payment and securities 
settlement activities in institutions, which are not 
subject to speciﬁ  c requirements for these risks. 
In practice, it was necessary to analyse the current 
national and international regulatory regimes 
relevant for European banks, CSDs and ICSDs, 
and to compare them with the requirements in 
order to answer the following questions:
•  Is there any overlap between the provisions 
of the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations 
and the existing international and national 
requirements to which European SSSs and 
banks are subject?
•  Are current provisions equivalent or more 
restrictive (“super-equivalent”) for banks 
and CSDs? In what respect?
•  Does the overlap between the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations and existing regulation 
result in double requirements? 
This paper presents the results of this 
comparative analysis and attempts to answer 
such questions.
Chapter 2 describes the risk-based functional 
approach which forms the basis of the CPSS-
IOSCO Recommendations, and explains its 
r a t i o n a l e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  e l a b o r a t e s  o n  t h e  
conditions that should be met to ensure that the 
application of the risk-based functional approach 
does not impair the level playing-ﬁ  eld  among 
market players.
Chapter 3 p r o v i d e s  a n  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  
regulatory regimes that are relevant for the 
c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  s o m e  k e y  C P S S - I O S C O  
Recommendations. These address the main 
areas of risk relevant for SSSs: securities 
lending (Recommendation 5), credit and 
liquidity risk controls, including capital 
requirements (Recommendation 9), operational 
reliability (Recommendation 11) and custody 
risk (Recommendation 12). Transparency 
requirements (Recommendation 17) are also 
covered, since disclosure enables market 
participants to evaluate the risks associated 
with their participation in SSSs. In particular, 
this chapter provides the background for the 
comparison by identifying the relevant:
a )   E U  D i r e c t i v e s  ( t h e  C o d i ﬁ   ed Banking and 
Capital Adequacy Directives; the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID));
b)  international best practices for banks 
(“Principles for the management of 
credit risk” and “Sound practices for the 
management and supervision of operational 
risk” of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision); and 
c)  national legislation and regulations for CSDs 
(since banks are subject to harmonised EU 
banking regulations). 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 provide a detailed 
analysis and comparison, at the international 
and the national level respectively. They show 
that the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations do not 
introduce new regulatory requirements, as most 
of their areas of concern are already covered by 
existing regulation for supervised entities. 
With reference to the risks covered, the main 
conclusions of the paper can be summarised as 
follows:
–  At present, there is no EU-wide harmonised 
institutional regulation for CSDs. 
– If a CSD takes the form of a credit 
institution, then it is primarily subject to 
banking regulations, and in some cases to 
additional oversight requirements, as well 
as to self-regulation. All these regulatory 
measures aim to limit the risks to which the 
entity is exposed.7
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I   INTRODUCTION 
AND SUMMARY –  To the extent that banking regulations cover 
any kind of exposure, including intraday 
liquidity risk, the CPSS-IOSCO concerns 
with respect to credit, operational, custody 
and legal risks are addressed by banking 
regulations.
–  Banking regulations neither cover CSDs, 
nor clearing and settlement activities which 
are not banking activities to which mutual 
recognition applies under the Capital 
Requirements Directive. 
– Consequently,  speciﬁ  c  requirements 
concerning the CSD function (e.g. ensuring 
the integrity of securities issues) or 
settlement services (e.g. delivery versus 
payment or intraday  ﬁ   nality) are not 
expressly addressed by banking regulations. 
This applies to capital requirements, 
prudential measures and best practices set 
out in banking regulations.
– Thus, oversight recommendations may 
contribute to a consistent level of protection 
for all CSDs and ICSDs.8
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2  THE RISK-BASED FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
In order to ensure a level playing-ﬁ  eld  for 
the different entities providing clearing and 
settlement services, i.e. CSDs and banks, the 
CPSS and IOSCO developed their common 
standards on the basis of a risk-based functional 
approach. Two complementary principles 
underline the adoption of this approach:
–  First, the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations 
are to be applied to all risks stemming 
from the different functions related to 
the securities clearing and settlement 
business, irrespective of the legal status of 
the institutions bearing those risks. This 
applies, in particular, to those institutions 
which perform several functions at the same 
time (e.g. CSD and banking activities).
–  Second, the application of the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations should primarily take 
into account the different risks posed by the 
various individual entities which carry out 
the same function. This means that different 
entities may undertake the same activities but 
be subject to different types and levels of 
regulation.6 This may occur because there are 
different ways of delivering the same services 
with different risk proﬁ  les. In this case, risk-
based functional approaches do not always 
imply that the same risk management 
requirements should be adopted for all entities 
carrying out the same activities. 
However, the fulﬁ  lment of these conditions does 
not in itself guarantee the proper application 
o f  t h e  r i s k - b a s e d  f u n c t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  a n d  
therefore the absolute absence of competitive 
distortions. For an effective and fair application 
of the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations, two 
additional conditions should be met to ensure 
equal competition in clearing and settlement 
services:
–  First, the standards should take due account 
of regulation that currently exists, and not 
impose extra and unnecessary regulation on 
those market participants which are already 
regulated on a satisfactory basis.
–  Second, a correct implementation of the 
recommendations presupposes the adoption 
of common deﬁ  nitions for the activities that 
form part of the clearing and settlement 
process.
– With regard to the ﬁ   rst condition, it 
is acknowledged that the assessment 
methodology of the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations for SSSs acknowledges 
that, although they are primarily addressed 
to CSDs, a number of them may also be 
relevant for custodians, e.g. securities lending 
(Recommendation 5), delivery versus 
payment, or DVP (Recommendation 7), 
credit and liquidity risk control 
(Recommendation 9), operational reliability 
(Recommendation 11), protection of 
customer assets (Recommendation 12), 
and transparency (Recommendation 17). 
However, the way in which the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations are applied to banks 
providing clearing and settlement services 
needs to take proper account of the 
obligations stemming from Community and 
national legislation to which these entities 
are subject. In particular, with a view to 
preventing an unnecessary regulatory burden 
on banks, in some cases a certain function 
may also be subject to different regulation, 
depending on the institutional status of 
the entity that performs it. For example, 
since the credit activity of custodian banks 
is already subject to European banking 
regulations, the relevant CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation (Recommendation 9) 
recognises that the supervision of credit risk 
is a matter for banking supervisors.
For instance, securities lending may or may not involve credit  6 
risk.9
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2   THE  RISK-BASED 
FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 
It is however important that supervisors take 
into adequate consideration risks stemming 
from clearing and settlement activities and 
consider settlement (including intraday 
exposures) as any other credit and liquidity 
exposure. With regard to the second condition, 
the beneﬁ  ts stemming from the application of a 
risk-based functional approach are closely 
related to the existence of common functional 
deﬁ  nitions of clearing and settlement activities 
as well as the technical and legal aspects of 
carrying out these functions in different types 
of institution. The deﬁ  nitions of risks remain 
the same as those in the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations. However, due to the 
sensitiveness of the issue, it was felt that 
functional deﬁ   nitions deserved further 
a t t e n t i o n ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  
functions and the related risks in the current 
market structure. Nevertheless, no deﬁ  nitions 
have been provided so far of the institutions or, 
in particular, of the functions which each 
institution is allowed to perform. It could be for 
instance important to have an agreed deﬁ  nition 
of central securities depositories and of the 
services they provide.7 
In 2004 a functional approach was also 
p r o p o s e d  b y  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m i s s i o n  i n  
the framework of its strategy for achieving 
an integrated, safe and efﬁ   cient clearing and 
settlement environment for securities trading 
in the EU.8 Based on the need to ensure a 
level playing-ﬁ   eld for the different providers 
of services, the proposal highlighted the fact 
that there was no need to segregate banking 
activity for the application of the functional 
approach. The parties involved were invited to 
comment on the Commission’s proposal, also 
taking into account the arrangements which 
exist in some European domestic markets and 
which differentiate between infrastructure and 
banking functions. Some functional deﬁ  nitions 
have been provided within the framework of the 
Code of Conduct for clearing and settlement. 
However, the Code does not aim at achieving 
ﬁ   nancial stability (but rather at promoting 
competition and thereby integration). As a 
consequence, the work done by the Commission 
may need to be complemented with a more risk-
based set of deﬁ  nitions that can be used by both 
regulators and overseers. In this vein, ECOFIN 
is discussing whether and how to adapt them 
to the European context (a ﬁ   nal decision is 
expected next year).
Unless differently speciﬁ  ed, the source of the deﬁ  nitions in this  7 
paper is the CPSS-ISOCO Recommendations. Some market 
participants consider it counterproductive to use institutional 
deﬁ  nitions. In Europe, in view of the adoption by the industry 
of a European Code of Conduct for clearing and settlement, the 
European Commission deﬁ  ned both institutions and functions.
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the  8 
European Parliament, “Clearing and settlement in the European 
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3  EU REGULATORY REGIMES AND RISKS 
RELATED TO SOME OF THE CPSS-IOSCO 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The banking regulatory framework in the ﬁ  eld 
of SSSs is not as speciﬁ  c as the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations. In particular, the risks 
covered by banking regulations (e.g. credit, 
liquidity and operational risks) are those that 
banks bear with respect to their overall activity. 
Whenever banks operate in the area of securities 
clearing and settlement, this implies that:
-  on the one hand, if banks bear, e.g. credit 
risk for payment systems-related activity, 
this credit risk will be regulated in the same 
way as any other credit risk stemming from 
banking activities;
-  on the other hand, no speciﬁ  c requirement 
has been imposed on risks stemming in 
particular from payment and securities 
settlement activities.
With the application of the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations, it is therefore reasonable 
that safekeeping, asset transfer and banking 
activities are supervised to the minimum 
standards imposed on banks, regardless of the 
nature of the institutions carrying out such 
activities. Therefore, no additional provisions or 
inconsistencies would arise where institutions 
are already supervised to the minimum 
standards in such areas. 
3.1 EU  DIRECTIVES 
The adoption of a Directive in the ﬁ  eld of clearing 
and settlement is a well thought-out move by the 
Commission as a suboptimal solution. In 2004 
the European regulator felt that a framework 
Directive may be needed for an efﬁ  cient, safe 
and cheap cross-border clearing and settlement 
industry. Following the outcome of a thorough 
consultation and an impact assessment, this 
stance was reviewed in July 2006.9
According to the Commission, the proposal 
of any kind of regulatory measure in the ﬁ  eld 
of clearing and settlement could slow down, 
or even block, the restructuring process 
already under way in this ﬁ   eld. In reaching 
this conclusion, which is very much embedded 
in the “Better Regulation” approach,10 the 
Commission favoured an industry-led approach 
to a more efﬁ  cient and integrated post-trading 
market in the EU and called upon the industry 
to provide a suitable solution. In response to this 
call, the three main industry associations – the 
Federation of European Securities Exchanges 
(FESE), European Association of Central 
C o u n t e r p a r t y  C l e a r i n g  H o u s e s  ( E A C H )  a n d  
European Central Securities Depositories 
Association (ECSDA) – prepared a Code of 
Conduct that was signed in November 2006. 
The measures detailed in the Code address 
three main issues: (i) transparency of prices 
and services; (ii) access and interoperability; 
(iii) unbundling of services and accounting 
separation.
In the absence of an ad hoc regulatory 
framework for clearing and settlement at the 
EU level, the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations 
represent the supranational benchmarks with 
which national legislation could comply. This 
may ensure coherent oversight and supervision 
of securities clearing and settlement also at the 
EU level, the need for which is even stronger in 
the absence of primary legislation. 
In the EU regulatory framework, two Directives 
deal with topics addressed by the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations and are relevant for the 
analysis of prudential requirements for 
securities settlement: the Capital Requirements 
Directive (comprising Directive 2006/48/EC 
See Commissioner McCreevy’s speech SPEECH/06/450 and  9 
Annex II of the “Draft working document on post-trading 
activities”, 23 May 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
ﬁ  nancial-markets/clearing/communication_en.htm
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3   EU  REGULATORY 
REGIMES AND 
RISKS RELATED 
TO SOME OF 
THE CPSS-IOSCO 
RECOMMENDATIONS
and Directive 2006/49/EC) and the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive, or MiFID 
(2004/39/EC).11
RISKS AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
The objective of the regulatory capital in the 
ﬁ  nancial sector is to set a comprehensive and 
risk-sensitive framework and foster enhanced 
risk management amongst ﬁ  nancial institutions. 
Compared with the oversight regime of the 
CSDs, which is based on a combination of 
collateral requirements and limits (see CPSS-
IOSCO Recommendation 9 – section 4.2), 
the capital requirements framework requires 
sound criteria for credit-granting, ongoing 
administration, monitoring and adequate 
diversiﬁ  cation. 
In the EU this set of provisions is enforced by the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), which 
was adopted by the Council and the European 
Parliament in June 2006. The CRD introduced 
an updated supervisory framework, which 
reﬂ  ects the Basel II rules on capital standards 
agreed at G10 level. This framework fosters risk 
management and encourages improvements in 
banks’ risk assessment capabilities. The Basel 
II framework, which is the basis for these 
c h a n g e s  t o  E U  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  a i m s  t o  e n h a n c e  
the effectiveness of capital regulation and the 
stability of the banking system. The effectiveness 
of capital regulation is primarily increased by a 
more comprehensive framework which broadens 
the scope of capital regulation through a higher 
level of risk sensitivity. The stability of the 
banking system is enhanced ﬁ  rst and foremost 
because capital requirements are better aligned 
with the risks taken by the individual banks.
In the Basel II and the EU framework, several 
aspects are relevant for risks associated with 
securities transactions. In particular, credit risk 
and operational risk are explicitly covered by 
the new regulatory regime. Indeed, the Basel 
II framework entails substantive changes to the 
treatment of credit risk and the introduction of 
an explicit capital requirement for operational 
risk. For both credit and operational risk, three 
a p p r o a c h e s  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  r i s k  s e n s i t i v i t y  a r e  
foreseen to allow banks and supervisors to 
select the approaches that they believe to be the 
most appropriate to the stage of development 
of bank operations and the ﬁ  nancial  market 
infrastructure. 
Banking supervisory tools and techniques 
regarding securities transactions are also clearly 
set out under the Basel II framework and the 
proposed EU rules. First, there is a combination 
of credit and operational risk provisions 
regarding the quantitative deﬁ  nition  of 
minimum capital requirements.12 For example, 
in the standardised approach for operational 
risk, payment and settlement activities will be 
assigned a capital charge of 18% of the average 
over three years of the sum of the interest 
income and annual non-interest income in that 
business line. The business line is deﬁ  ned as 
money and transmission services, issuing and 
administering means of payment.
This set of provisions is complemented by the 
qualitative assessment of risks, risk mitigation 
techniques, and internal controls by the 
supervisory authorities.13  In particular, the 
new framework introduces more risk-sensitive 
approaches to the treatment of collateral, 
guarantees, credit derivatives, netting and 
securitisation, which need to be assessed by 
supervisors.
Finally, clear limits for large credit exposures 
are set by the Basel II framework. These limits 
on large exposures also cover the speciﬁ  c risks 
of individual issuers in the trading book.
Although the risks posed by clearing and 
settlement are generally taken into consideration 
by banking regulations, the current and 
forthcoming capital adequacy regimes 
The Capital Requirements Directive comprising Directive  11 
2006/48/EC and Directive 2006/49/EC was published in the 
Ofﬁ  cial Journal of the European Union on 30 June 2006.
Pillar 1 of the new Basel II framework sets out criteria for  12 
banking organisations to adopt more risk-sensitive minimum 
capital requirements. In particular, it lays out principles for 
banks to assess the adequacy of their capital. 
P i l l a r  I I  o f  B a s e l  I I  s e t s  o u t  p r i n c i p l e s  d e s i g n e d  t o  h e l p   13 
supervisors to review the assessment of capital adequacy and to 
ensure that banks have adequate capital to support their risks.12
ECB
Occasional Paper No 76
December 2007
may not be appropriate to cover all critical 
aspects in the area of securities clearing and 
settlement (the banking regulatory framework 
does not address explicitly, for instance, 
Delivery-versus-Payment or other technical 
speciﬁ  cities of clearing and settlement, as the 
latter are not listed as banking activities). This 
is especially the case for intraday and overnight 
credit exposures. The intraday lines extended 
for securities settlement are intended to 
facilitate the timely settlement of transactions in 
the securities markets. The essence of intraday 
credit is that it is not expected to result in an 
actual credit extension, except in cases where 
an operational failure of either trade delivery 
or funding payment by the customer is not 
resolved by the end of the day and results in an 
overdraft in the customer account. Compliance 
with capital requirements and large exposure 
limits is reported to banking supervisors on 
the basis of quarterly or half-yearly end-of-day 
data, but the requirements have to be met at all 
times and the internal policies for measuring 
and managing the exposures to the various 
risk proﬁ   les, including those emerging from 
i n t r a d a y  c r e d i t ,  f o r m  a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  
prudential controls performed by banking 
supervisors.
HOME-HOST RESPONSIBILITY 
The home-host supervisory responsibility is one 
of the key issues related to the implementation 
of the CRD. Compared with Basel II, the EU 
capital framework is intended to improve home-
host supervisory cooperation by enhancing 
responsibilities of the authority responsible 
for consolidated supervision (usually based in 
the home country of a bank). In particular, the 
new capital framework assigns to the authority 
responsible for consolidated supervision a 
coordinating supervisory role and the power to 
take certain prudential decisions (see Article 
129 of the CRD). 
Even though a prominent role of the “home 
a u t h o r i t i e s ”  i s  a c k n o w l e d g e d  b y  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
international agreements between central banks 
and securities regulators – including the CPSS-
IOSCO Recommendations – a growing 
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  s y s t e m i c a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  
infrastructures located in, operated from or 
managed from foreign countries makes the 
analysis of possible changes in the home-host 
responsibility relevant also for clearing and 
s e t t l e m e n t  s y s t e m s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a d d r e s s  
regulatory concerns efﬁ  ciently and address any 
liquidity problems that may be triggered in a 
cross-border dimension by payment, clearing 
and settlement systems, overseers and regulators 
have established cooperative arrangements and 
memoranda of understanding to support the 
oversight of these infrastructures, enabling 
effective leverage over decisions that inﬂ  uence 
systemic risk in the respective countries.
In a cross-border dimension, both supervision 
and oversight cooperative frameworks 
should aim at responding to the increasing 
internationalisation of ﬁ  nancial  markets 
and institutions by designing supervisory 
arrangements that avoid gaps and reduce 
the risk of inconsistent policies, while 
eliminating unnecessary regulatory burdens. 
For some ﬁ   nancial institutions, and also for 
systemically important payment and settlement 
systems, cooperative oversight or supervisory 
arrangements are necessary to ensure 
appropriate mitigation of systemic risk. 
In the absence of cooperative frameworks, 
there is a risk that the “host” authorities where 
a payment system is systemically important do 
not have adequate powers or inﬂ  uence over a 
system which is integrated abroad. On the other 
hand, “home” authorities with effective powers 
might not give sufﬁ  cient priority to the systemic 
risk concerns of overseas authorities.
In addition, and without prejudice to the existing 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  h o m e  o r  h o s t  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
a degree of ﬂ   exibility over which authorities 
(central banks or supervisory authorities, if not 
equivalent) should coordinate oversight may be 
taken into account by the countries concerned 
instead of applying a mechanistic choice of 
either home or host authority.13
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3   EU  REGULATORY 
REGIMES AND 
RISKS RELATED 
TO SOME OF 
THE CPSS-IOSCO 
RECOMMENDATIONS
MARKETS IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS DIRECTIVE 
Contrary to the CRD, the MiFID does not address 
risks or other issues related to clearing and 
settlement. It only imposes some organisational 
requirements on investment ﬁ  rms regarding the 
safeguarding of clients’ assets, similar to CPSS-
IOSCO Recommendation 12 on the protection 
of customers’ securities.14 The rationale for 
not addressing issues relating to clearing and 
settlement is summarised in Section V.1 of the 
explanatory memorandum of the Directive. In 
particular, it highlights how, in the absence of 
harmonised risk management practices and an 
effective supervisory framework, the inclusion 
of the clearing and settlement functions in the 
list of investment services would not only fail to 
deliver an effective single market environment 
for the organisation of these activities, but 
could also prove to be counterproductive 
from the perspective of sound prudential 
supervision of these entities. Essentially, it 
has been recognised that, due to the systemic 
importance of operators offering such services 
and the complex technical and public policy 
considerations involved, the regulation of these 
d i s t i n c t  t y p e s  o f  m a r k e t  f u n c t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  
addressed separately. On the other hand, the 
close relationship between trading and post-
trading requires coordinated regulation. This 
idea was supported by the ECB in its opinion 
on the MiFID recommending that the European 
Commission  ﬁ   n a l i s e  a n  a d e q u a t e  r e g i m e  f o r  
clearing and settlement.15
Article 34 of the MiFID, however, recognises the 
right of investment ﬁ  rms to designate the system 
for the settlement of transactions in ﬁ  nancial 
instruments undertaken on the regulated 
market. This possibility is subject, inter alia, 
to the agreement of the competent supervisory 
authority attesting that the technical conditions 
for settlement of transactions concluded on the 
regulated market through a settlement system, 
other than that designated by the regulated 
market, are such as to allow the smooth and 
orderly functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets. 
This provision aims to create objective criteria 
with which the competent authorities can 
assess the designation of a particular system by 
indirect or remote members of, or participants 
in, a domestic regulated market. In this context, 
however, it is vital to ensure that the competent 
authorities are not perceived by participants 
to discriminate in favour of domestic systems 
where these authorities do not agree with a 
particular designation, provided that their 
decision is based on objective and harmonised 
criteria.
3.2 BEST  PRACTICES 
With the “Principles for the management of 
credit risk”, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision encouraged banking supervisors 
globally to promote sound practice for managing 
credit risk. Although the principles are mostly 
applicable to the business of lending, they should 
be applied to all activities where credit risk is 
present, making the board and senior management 
responsible for determining and implementing 
coherent credit policies. The sound practices set 
out by the Basel Committee address the following 
areas: (i) establishing an appropriate credit 
risk environment; (ii) operating under sound 
credit-granting processes; (iii) maintaining an 
appropriate credit administration, measurement 
and monitoring process; and (iv) ensuring 
adequate controls over credit risks. 
The principles set out by the Basel Committee 
should be used in evaluating a bank’s credit risk 
management system. According to the 
principles, a further particular instance of credit 
risk relates to the process of settling ﬁ  nancial 
t r a n s a c t i o n s .  S e t t l e m e n t  r i s k  t h u s  i n c l u d e s  
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the  14 
Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in ﬁ  nancial instruments 
amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and 
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC. This 
Directive was adopted after four years of intense negotiation 
and replaced the regime set up by the 1993 Investment Services 
Directive (93/22/EEC).
Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 June 2003 on  15 
investment services and regulated markets, and amending 
Council Directive 85/611/EEC, Council Directive 93/6/EEC 
and European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC 
(COM(2002) 625 ﬁ  nal) - (CON/2003/9).14
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e l e m e n t s  o f  l i q u i d i t y ,  m a r k e t  o p e r a t i o n a l  a n d  
reputational risk as well as credit risk.16
The level of risk is determined by the particular 
arrangements for settlement. Elements of these 
arrangements that have a bearing on credit risk 
inc lude : the timing o f the ex change o f value ; 
payment/settlement  ﬁ   nality; and the role of 
intermediaries and clearing houses.
Another group of best practices put forward 
by the BCBS concern operational risk. The 
“Sound practices for the management and 
supervision of operational risk”, which were 
prepared by the Risk Management Group of 
the Basel Committee, address this new and 
growing category of risks faced by banks. 
Among them, the growing use of outsourcing 
arrangements and participation in clearing and 
settlement systems are seen as ways to mitigate 
certain risks, but also as a potential source of 
new risks to banks. Such risks, together with 
others such as legal risk (but excluding strategic 
and reputational risks), are grouped under the 
heading of operational risk, which the Basel 
Committee has deﬁ   ned as the risk of loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external 
events. Operational risk event types identiﬁ  ed 
by the Basel Committee in cooperation with 
the industry as having the potential to produce 
substantial losses include execution, delivery 
and process management aspects such as 
data entry error and collateral management 
failures. 
Following a similar approach to its work on 
credit risk, the Basel Committee structured 
the sound practices on operational risk 
around a number of principles. In addition to 
those principles which strictly refer to risk 
management (e.g. identiﬁ  cation,  assessment, 
monitoring and mitigation/control), there are 
also sound practices relating to the role of 
supervisors in: i) requiring banks to establish 
an effective framework for risk management; 
ii) monitoring and ensuring that the most 
appropriate procedures and practices are 
i n  p l a c e .  I n  p e r f o r m i n g  t h i s  a s s e s s m e n t ,  
cooperation and exchange of information 
with other supervisors may be necessary 
in accordance with established procedures.
3.3 NATIONAL  LEGISLATION/REGULATION 
At the national level, the implementation 
and enforcement of EU Directives and best 
p r a c t i c e s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  
functions of clearing and securities settlement, 
vary across Member States. With a number of 
speciﬁ   c variations, three regulatory regimes 
can be broadly identiﬁ  ed with regard to CSDs, 
whereby the activities of custodian banks are 
covered by banking regulations:  17
(1) CSDs are licensed credit institutions but 
clearing and settlement are not classiﬁ  ed as 
banking activity and, thus, are not subject to 
banking supervision.
(2) CSDs are not banks and they do not provide 
credit to their participants. Therefore, no 
comparison with national banking legislation 
is applicable.
(3) CSDs are not banks but they are allowed to 
provide their participants with credit or loans 
to settle their positions. Ad hoc regulations 
deal with this (typically intraday) credit 
activity, although they are not applicable to 
banks that are allowed to grant credit within 
appropriate risk control limits.
In the absence of any harmonised EU regulation 
in this ﬁ  eld, it is ackno w ledged that it is not 
possible to achieve convergence of regulatory 
practices concerning the scope of business 
of CSDs, and notably the management of 
credit and liquidity risks incurred by CSDs, 
beyond the agreement reached by the CPSS 
and IOSCO and reﬂ  ected in the provisions of 
Recommendation 9.
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Principles for  16 
the Management of Credit Risk", September 2000, page 2.
In speciﬁ  c situations, only ICSDs operate in the market; thus,  17 
the banking supervisor has the right to prescribe the same 
requirements as for banks.15
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The comparison in the following section 
focuses on CPSS-IOSC Recommendations that 
relate primarily to counterparty, liquidity and 
operational risks (5, 9, 11, 12 and 17) and the 
respective regulation and principles concerning 
credit institutions and investment ﬁ  rms in order 
to determine whether these recommendations 
duplicate or complement existing banking 
regulations. The following sub-sections ﬁ  rst 
describe the recommendation and the banking 
regulations and then provide a conclusion as 
to whether the recommendation is covered 
by the banking regulations or not. They focus 
on CSDs, with or without banking status, 
banks and investment ﬁ   rms. As this is the 
ﬁ   rst comparison between requirements, each 
C P S S - I O S C O  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  d e s c r i b e d  
explicitly.
4.1  RECOMMENDATION 5: SECURITIES LENDING 
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 5 on securities 
lending has two main objectives. First, it 
encourages the creation of a legal and tax 
r e g i m e  t h a t  s u p p o r t s  s e c u r i t i e s  l e n d i n g  
domestically and across borders to reduce 
settlement failures. Second, supervisors and 
o v e r s e e r s  s h o u l d  h a v e  p o l i c i e s  t o  e n s ur e  t h a t  
risks from securities lending services are 
properly managed by the supervised/overseen 
entities. Some CSDs provide centralised 
lending facilities and others offer services to 
support the bilateral lending market. It is up to 
the individual market to evaluate the beneﬁ  ts 
of each type of facility. In this regard, when an
(I)CSD offers securities lending and, although it 
does not legally act as a principal, economically 
speaking it undertakes counterparty risk 
because it guarantees the lending operation 
(i.e. the restitution of securities). In general, 
the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation explicitly 
encourages securities lending as a method for 
expediting securities settlement and reducing 
settlement risk. However, considering that 
this is in principle an extra service outside 
the scope of core CSD services offered by 
the settlement entity, it is important that the 
provision of the service does not create “new” 
risks and that it occurs in a competitive and 
transparent environment.
This recommendation on securities lending 
does not create new requirements because the 
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations are concerned 
with the operational, legal and counterparty 
risks that may arise as a result of securities 
lending transactions and appropriate mitigation 
strategies. CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 9 
has a bearing on the reading of CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation 5 because the former foresees 
that CSDs should not allow overdrafts or debit 
b a l a n c e s  o n  s e c u r i t i e s  a c c o u n t s  w h e n  C S D s  
arrange for securities loans to participants to 
facilitate timely settlement.  
Turning to the regulatory treatment of securities 
lending, at ﬁ  rst sight banking regulations could 
give the impression of being fairly neutral with 
r e g a r d  t o  s e c u r i t i e s  l e n d i n g .  I n  b a n k i n g  
regulations, securities lending in terms of 
generating credit and custody risks is treated as 
any other such risk in the Capital Requirements 
Directive inspired by the Basel II framework 
(hereafter referred to as the CRD).18
A careful analysis shows that securities lending 
as a means of risk mitigation is derived from the 
principle of effective internal risk management 
systems laid down in Article 22 (1) of the CRD, 
which requires “effective processes to identify, 
manage, monitor and report the risks [that the 
c r e d i t  i n s t i t u t i o n ]  i s  o r  m i g h t  b e  e x p o s e d  t o  
and adequate internal control mechanisms, 
including sound administrative and accounting 
procedures”. Given the diversity of credit 
institutions, this requirement is to be met on a 
proportionate basis. 
Furthermore, a more careful reading of the 
CRD shows that, although securities lending 
i s  n o t  e xp li c i tl y  required  as  a  ri s k  mi ti g a ti o n  
technique, the CRD implicitly encourages 
Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the  18 
Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of 
the business of credit institutions (recast), OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, 
p. 1.16
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securities lending in various ways, as does 
the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation. First, 
securities lending is recognised as one of the 
three categories of collateralised transaction 
(securities lending, securities borrowing 
and repurchase agreements). Second, credit 
institutions may apply a risk weight of zero to 
securities lending with core market participants, 
s u c h  a s  r e c o g n i s e d  c l e a r i n g  h o u s e s .  T h e  
difference can be seen in the fact that this risk 
weight becomes 10% if the counterparty is not 
a  c o r e  m a r k e t  p a r t i c i p a n t .  T h i r d ,  s e c u r i t i e s  
lending agreements (and securities borrowing 
and repurchase agreements) are usually subject 
to the same favourable treatment, provided that 
the documentation used is the usual standard 
market agreements without any material 
change (Annex VIII No 59 (f)). In that sense, 
the CRD has already addressed the concerns 
that the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation wishes 
to cover when discussing securities lending as a 
risk mitigation technique.
Another important piece of legislation, the 
MiFID, does not contain any provisions in 
relation to the avoidance of securities settlement 
failures since it is, by deﬁ   nition, devoted to 
trading rather than post-trading activities. 
Consequently, the MiFID devotes attention 
to the minimisation of settlement failure for 
regulated markets which are required, inter 
alia, to have effective arrangements to facilitate 
the efﬁ   cient and timely ﬁ   nalisation of the 
transactions executed under its systems (Article 
39 (e)). This could be construed to include 
facilities that allow for timely ﬁ  nalisation, 
among which is securities lending, if any 
such failure were to occur on the trading side. 
However, it is more evident that securities 
lending is effective on the side of clearing and 
settlement. Thus, the risk considerations of this 
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation for settlement 
risk for that particular group of entities are 
reﬂ  ected in the MiFID. 
Securities lending is not explicitly mentioned 
in the “Principles for the management of 
credit risk”. However, it can be construed to be 
reﬂ  ected in Principle 15, which requires banks 
to ensure that credit exposures are within levels 
consistent with prudential standards and internal 
limits. Internal audits are to ensure that credit 
activities are compliant with the banks’ credit 
policies. On the other hand, Principle 17 invites 
supervisors to require an effective system to 
identify, measure, monitor and control credit 
risk and to assess a bank’s policies. Supervisors 
s h o u l d  s e t  p r u d e n t i a l  l i m i t s  t o  r e s t r i c t  b a n k  
exposures to single borrowers or groups. Under 
the above principles, securities lending could be 
construed as a method to mitigate and control 
c r e d i t  r i s k  a n d ,  i n  t h a t  r e g a r d ,  i t  c o u l d  b e  
assessed or even required by supervisors as part 
of a bank’s sound risk management policies. 
Thus, the basic principle of securities lending 
as a risk mitigation method is broadly reﬂ  ected 
in the banking regulations and best practices. 
Finally, Basel II recognises, and to some extent 
implicitly encourages, securities lending as a 
risk mitigation tool. For credit risk generated 
by securities lending, the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation urges counterparties to 
Table 1 CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 5 and related legislation
Recommendation 5 CRD MiFID
Encourages use of securities lending to 
reduce settlement failures.
Securities lending is a risk mitigation 
tool. It is recognised as a collateralised 
transaction with a risk weight of zero for 
core market participants and 10% for non-
core participants.
Regulated markets are required to have 
arrangements to facilitate efﬁ  cient and 
timely ﬁ  nalisation.
Counterparties to securities loans should 
employ appropriate risk management 
policies.
Securities lending is found in Annex VIII 
as one of three categories of collateralised 
transaction; the requirements relate only to 
the recognition of the effects of collateral 
used in this kind of transaction.
No provision.17
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COMPARISON securities loans to employ appropriate risk 
management policies. This is a similar approach 
to the one taken by Basel II, which has no speciﬁ  c 
category of risk for securities lending. Thus, the 
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation can rely on 
banking regulations for the treatment of securities 
lending and related risks by institutions supervised 
under banking standards. A schematic summary 
of the above is shown in the table below.
4.2  RECOMMENDATION 9: CSD RISK CONTROLS 
TO ADDRESS PARTICIPANTS’ FAILURES TO 
SETTLE
CSDs often extend intraday credit to 
participants either as a principal or as an agent 
for other participants. Whenever a CSD extends 
credit, the risk arises that failures to settle may 
generate credit losses and liquidity pressures on 
the CSD or its participants. If the losses exceed 
the  ﬁ   nancial resources of those expected to 
bear them, further failures to settle may cause 
disruptions to the securities markets the CSD 
serves and payment systems.  
To avoid such conditions, CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation 9 limits the credit activities 
of a CSD by prohibiting overdrafts in securities 
accounts and by encouraging the use of the most 
reliable set of controls: a combination of collateral 
requirements and limits. Under this approach, 
the control of potential credit exposures is 
achieved through their full collateralisation with 
the application of haircuts to reﬂ  ect the price 
volatility of the collateral. At the same time, 
potential liquidity pressures are controlled by 
imposing limits on the extension of credit. Thus, 
on the funds side, the CSD has to limit the credit 
exposure to each participant at amounts that could 
be covered by the CSD or participants under 
the respective arrangements. On the securities 
side, a CSD which arranges securities loans to 
participants to avoid settlement failures can do 
so under the condition that debit balances are not 
created because CSDs should not allow overdrafts 
or debit balances on securities accounts.
Taking a completely different approach, the 
relevant banking legislation does not limit credit 
activities because this is the core function of 
banking business. Banking legislation requires 
sound criteria for credit-granting, ongoing 
administration, monitoring and adequate 
diversiﬁ   cation. Thus, credit institutions and 
investment  ﬁ   rms are required ﬁ   rst to have 
minimum initial capital. Second, both types of 
entity are required to use credit risk mitigation 
techniques to manage credit and liquidity 
risks effectively. Third, credit institutions 
and investment ﬁ   rms are subject to capital 
requirements, meaning own funds that have to 
be maintained at all times. Intraday exposures 
are not subject to capital requirements. Finally, 
banking legislation provides that the activities of 
credit institutions and investment ﬁ  rms should 
be limited to those areas where the entity has 
adequate organisation, systems and controls. 
Credit institutions and ICSDs with banking 
status are generally subject to capital 
requirements, while CSDs that do not have 
banking status generally are not.  19 As regards 
risk mitigation techniques, the recommendation 
focuses on full collateralisation for credit 
(including intraday credit), while the banking 
legislation does not explicitly require any 
percentage of collateralisation of credit 
exposures. However, as collateralisation reduces 
the amount of capital that needs to be maintained, 
credit institutions have increasingly felt the need 
to free up more capital by making extensive use 
of various types of eligible collateral for their 
banking activities, thus moving closer to the 
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation. Moreover, the 
need for collateralisation can be construed to 
form part of the “adequate internal control 
mechanisms, including sound administrative 
and accounting procedures” of a bank laid down 
in Article 22 of the CRD. 
In addition to the incentives that a bank has to 
collateralise its credit risk, banking supervisors 
may increase capital requirements if the level 
of collateralisation is deemed insufﬁ  cient. This 
is one of ﬁ  ve supervisory tools foreseen under 
Whether or not they are subject to capital requirements depends  19 
on the national legal framework (see chapter 5).18
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Article 136 (1) of the CRD; however, another 
restricts the business, operation or network, or 
the risks inherent in activities, products and 
systems. The latter could implicitly form the 
basis for an increase in collateralisation if a 
credit institution no longer met the requirements 
of the CRD. 
Under the current regime, a credit institution 
is responsible for the method through which 
it chooses to meet its capital requirements. 
Consequently, a credit institution may 
collateralise using eligible collateral in order 
to reduce the cost of capital and, thus, expand 
the range of its banking and investment 
activities. Therefore, on this particular point 
of collateralisation of credit risk, there is 
some convergence between the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation and banking regulations.  
A further point of comparison concerns 
supervisory coordination. Under the CPSS-
IOSCO approach, the degree of compliance 
with the recommendations should be assessed 
by regulators, supervisors and overseers, 
and information should be shared according 
to Recommendation 18. Under the banking 
legislation, on the other hand, banking 
supervisory authorities have to review 
compliance with the banking legislation. 
Information sharing is included within the 
scope of consolidated supervision and reliance 
on home country supervision with some 
restricted role for the host authorities. This also 
includes intraday liquidity , and it can thus be 
considered that the CPSS-IOSCO concerns are 
reﬂ  ected and can be adequately monitored by 
banking supervisors. 
Similarly, a solid framework of cooperation 
among competent authorities is foreseen under 
the MiFID. For investment ﬁ   rms, Article 56 
of the MiFID foresees extensive cooperation 
among national authorities and with the EU 
authorities. The European Commission is in 
the process of deﬁ  ning how this information 
ﬂ  ow will be organised at the level of the EU 
authorities. The notion of systemic relevance is 
a criterion to be applied when determining the 
frequency and intensity of the review by the 
competent authorities. 
In addition to the points discussed in 
Chapter 3, the “Principles for the management 
o f  c r e d i t  ri s k”  h a v e  s tr o n g  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  ri s k  
identiﬁ  cation, measurement, control, monitoring 
and mitigation, and preferred methods are 
proposed. Supervisors are encouraged to 
set prudential limits that would apply to all 
banks irrespective of the quality of their credit 
risk management procedures, together with 
reporting requirements for credit exceeding 
established levels or granted to counterparties 
“connected” to the credit institution. Banking 
regulations focus on the adequate management 
of credit risk and have no capital requirements 
for intraday exposures. However, they provide 
supervisors with the tools to monitor intraday 
exposures if they wish, thus reﬂ  ecting to some 
extent the philosophy of the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation. 
The CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 
r e q u i r e s  C S D s  t o  p u t  i n  p l a c e  r i s k  c o n t r o l s  
to limit the potential for failures to settle to 
generate systemic disruption and requires full 
collateralisation of credit extensions, unlike 
banking regulations. That being said, there is an 
area of common ground where the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation and banking regulations can 
meet. First, banking regulations give incentives 
to banks to encourage collateralisation. Second, 
the banking legislation does not limit the 
power of supervisors to monitor liquidity and 
intraday risks, if they wish. In view of the above 
considerations, it can be concluded that there are 
no oversight concerns in relation to banks that 
satisfy the requirements of banking supervisors 
and, thus, their risk management policies may be 
excluded from the scope of the recommendation.
4.3  RECOMMENDATION 11: OPERATIONAL 
RELIABILITY
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 11 prescribes 
that sources of operational risk arising 
from the clearing and settlement process 
should be identiﬁ   ed and minimised through 19
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the development of appropriate systems, 
controls and procedures. Operators should 
establish procedures to address those risks 
and contingency plans for key systems which 
are reviewed and tested regularly. Business 
c o n t i n u i t y  p l a n s  h a v e  t o  b e  r e v i e w e d  a n d  
independently audited. The CPSS-IOSCO 
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  s y s t e m  o p e r a t o r s  
who outsource operations to ensure that those 
operations meet the same standards as if they 
were provided directly by the system operator.
Similarly, banking regulations require processes 
and policies to evaluate and manage exposures 
to operational risk. As with the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation, they recognise that systems 
may be sources of systemic risk and, thus, require 
effective risk management of operational risk.
Operational risk and outsourcing is also 
covered by the MiFID. Under Article 13 of 
the MiFID, investment ﬁ   rms should take all 
reasonable steps to ensure continuity and 
regularity in the performance of their activities 
( A r t i c l e  1 3  ( 4 ) ) .  F o r  t h a t  p u r p o s e ,  t h e y  h a v e  
Table 2 CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for counterparty and liquidity risk and related 
legislation 
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations CRD MiFID
Recommendation 5 
Securities lending and borrowing 
(or repurchase agreements and other 
economically equivalent transactions) should 
be encouraged as a method for expediting the 
settlement of securities transactions. Barriers 
that inhibit the practice of lending securities 
for this purpose should be removed.
No provision. No provision.
Recommendation 9
CSDs that extend intraday credit to 
participants, including CSDs that operate 
net settlement systems, should institute risk 
controls that, at a minimum, ensure timely 
settlement in the event that the participant 
with the largest payment obligation is unable 
to settle. The most reliable set of controls is 
a combination of collateral requirements and 
limits.
Credit risk mitigation techniques, foreseen in 
Articles 90-93, are detailed in Annex VIII.
No requirements present on the degree 
of collateralisation of exposures. Eligible 
collateralisation may however reduce the 
capital requirement.
Collateralisation could possibly be construed 
to be part of the robust governance 
arrangements required in Article 22 of the 
CRD.
Annex V, No 3, requires sound criteria for 
credit-granting, ongoing administration/
monitoring and adequate diversiﬁ  cation.
The CRD imposes:
a)   an aggregate limit of 25% for lending to 
connected counterparties;
b)   a 25% limit on all individual 
counterparties; and
c)   an 800% limit for total large exposures.
No requirements as to the duration of credits.
Regular reporting is required for any large 
exposures exceeding 10% of own funds as 
described in the CRD. Large exposures of 
25% to be reported at least quarterly.
No provision.
Recommendation 18
Securities settlement systems should be 
subject to transparent and effective regulation 
and oversight. Central banks and securities 
regulators should cooperate with each other 
and with other relevant authorities.
 The CRD contains a reference (in Articles 
123 and 124) to the risk management 
processes that ﬁ  rms must have in place and 
that the competent authority has to review. 
General provision of information 
ﬂ  ow and extensive cooperation 
of competent authorities under 
Article 56.20
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to employ appropriate and proportionate 
resources, systems and procedures. There is no 
requirement for prior approval of outsourcing 
by supervisors. Outsourcing may not be 
undertaken in such a way as to impair materially 
the quality of internal control or the ability of 
the supervisors to monitor the investment ﬁ  rm’s 
compliance with all obligations (Article 13 (5)). 
Principle 13 of the “Principles for the 
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  c r e d i t  r i s k ”  r e q u i r e s  b a n k s  
to perform a “what if” exercise and stress 
testing as part of their framework to 
address operational risk. In particular, the 
“Sound practices for the management and 
supervision of operational risk” focus on 
governance requirements, explicitly stating 
the responsibility of the board to be aware 
of a credit institution’s operational risks 
and to develop a framework to deal with 
operational risk. Senior management has the 
responsibility to implement a framework with 
tools to put in place and regularly review 
contingency plans. Banks have to identify 
critical business processes, including those 
where there is dependence on third parties, for 
which rapid resumption is critical, making the 
sound practices similar to the CPSS-IOSCO 
requirement in this respect. Supervisors are 
asked to ensure that all banks, regardless of 
size, have an effective framework to manage 
operational risk. Finally, public disclosure 
should allow investors and counterparties to 
evaluate whether or not a bank has an effective 
framework for managing operational risk. 
Credit institutions are subject to capital 
requirements under the banking legislation 
which may cover operational risks. Capital 
requirements are, in principle, not foreseen 
i n  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  C S D s  w i t h  n o  b a n k i n g  
licence. The situation is very diverse in the 
EU. A number of countries foresee no capital 
requirements for CSDs which have no banking 
licence. Consequently, these jurisdictions do not 
allow their CSDs to assume credit risk. Others 
require CSDs without banking status to post 
own funds (reserves, retained earnings and net 
income, not only initial capital) commensurate 
with any risk-related activity. Each country 
has devised its own coherent scheme to ensure 
that entities have the appropriate ﬁ  nancial 
resources to continue operating if operational 
risk occurs. This situation raises the issue 
of whether there is room for harmonisation 
regarding capital requirements for CSDs that 
do not have banking status in order to address 
operational risk. It is worth reﬂ  ecting  upon 
this issue, taking into account that operational 
risks are the same regardless of whether they 
are borne by entities that are credit institutions 
or not.
In sum, the main content of banking regulation 
and oversight recommendations largely overlap 
(see table 3). This is true for the general need 
t o  m i n i m i z e  o p e r a t i o n a l  r i s k s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
for some speciﬁ   c requirements in terms of 
governance, business continuity plans and audit 
requirements. The main differences relate to 
outsourcing, to the quantitative approach to 
Table 3 CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 11 and related legislation - What is common
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 11 Banking regulation (RBCD, Basel practices) MiFID
Minimize operational risks Policies and processes to evaluate and 
manage the exposures to operational risk. 
Need for control and mitigation.
All reasonable steps to ensure continuity 
and regularity in their performance
(article 13(4)).
Systems and related functions are subject 
to audit
No explicit reference to independent audit 
but reference to “competent authorities”.
Need for business continuity and disaster 
recovery plans
“Need for contingency and business 
continuity plans (annex V. n. 8, para.I).
Responsibilities for management Responsibilities for Board of Directors 
(developing strategy) and Senior 
management (implement)21
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estimating operational risk exposure and to the 
requirements of minimum capital coverage of 
such exposure (see table 4).
4.4  RECOMMENDATION 12: PROTECTION OF 
CUSTOMERS’ SECURITIES
C P S S - I O S C O  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n  1 2  u r g e s  
entities holding securities in custody to employ 
procedures ensuring that all customer assets are 
appropriately accounted for and kept safe, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  f r o m  c l a i m s  o f  t h o s e  e n t i t i e s ’  
creditors. This could be accomplished by: 
(a) identifying clients’ securities on the books 
of custodians and the CSD separately from own 
securities, which is known as “segregation”; 
and (b) regularly reconciling records to keep 
them accurate. Other ways to safeguard or 
protect customers against misappropriation and 
theft include internal controls and insurance or 
other compensation schemes. Entities that hold 
s e c u r i t i e s  m u s t  e n s u r e  t h a t  p r o c e d u r e s  a l l o w  
customer protection and are applicable, where 
relevant, to all upstream intermediaries in 
multi-tier holdings. These entities should be 
regulated and supervised (see key issue 3).20
Similarly, the MiFID spells out the duties 
of investment ﬁ  rms in Article 13 (7) and (8) 
and the respective CESR Level 2 measures to 
protect customer assets. The provisions contain 
detailed obligations for investment ﬁ  rms with 
respect to: (i) depositing customer funds in 
certain institutions; (ii) choosing regulated 
depositories for ﬁ  nancial instruments; and (iii) 
keeping appropriate records of ownership that 
ensure that the total of client assets corresponds 
to the amounts held for each individual client. 
These obligations largely reﬂ   ect the duty of 
CSDs to ensure the integrity of securities 
issues. The custody risk considerations of the 
recommendations are largely reﬂ   ected in the 
proposed Level 2 measures of the MiFID for the 
entities that the MiFID itself addresses. CESR 
believes that, owing to the lack of harmonisation 
in insolvency laws, Level 2 measures should 
be result-oriented rather than specifying rigid 
arrangements for every circumstance.
Safekeeping and administration services are 
deﬁ  ned in Annex I of the MiFID as ancillary 
s e rvi c e s  th a t  m a y  b e  p r o vi d e d  b y  in v e s tm e n t  
ﬁ   rms upon authorisation. However, it is 
acknowledged that the terms of “safekeeping” 
and “administration services” are not 
harmonised.
BIS (2002), “CPSS-IOSCO assessment methodology for  20 
‘Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems’”, Basel, 
November. 
Table 4 CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 11 and related legislation - What is different
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 11 Banking regulation (RBCD, Basel practices) MiFID
Minimisation of operational risks Possibility for banks to consciously take 
certain risks instead of minimising them. 
Risks are quantitatively estimated and 
subject to a minimum capital coverage.
Proportionality requirements (article 22(2)). Proportionate resources.
Outsourcing is responsibility of the 
outsourcer, who should ensure that 
outsourced operations meet the same 
standards as if they were provided directly 
by the outsourcer.
Basel Sound practices require: a) manage 
all risks linked to outsourcing; including
b) residual risks (e.g. disruption of 
services); c) need for legally robust 
contracts; d) clear allocation of 
responsibilities; e) outsourcing does not 
reduce the responsibilities of Board of 
Directors.
Outsourcing may not be undertaken if it 
impairs the quality of internal control and 
the ability of the supervisors to monitor.
Capital requirements: 3 approaches 
for their determination, from basic to 
advanced methods. All approaches are 
based on a consolidated calculation across 
all the business lines.22
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The recommendation is to a large extent 
reﬂ   ected in the MiFID and CESR Level 2 
measures. There are a few differences owing to 
the different scope of application of the MiFID 
on the trading side. Custody risk measures and 
investor protection in the MiFID broadly reﬂ  ect 
the CPSS-IOSCO considerations.
Banking regulations focus on different aspects 
of monitoring credit risk. A credit institution 
that holds deposits has different duties to 
an entity holding securities; because cash is 
fungible, it is shown as a liability on the balance 
sheet of a credit institution and it forms part of 
the bankruptcy estate of the credit institution, 
which means that customers may lose their 
deposits. 
Depositors can be protected up to a certain 
amount by a deposit insurance scheme. 
Securities are of a different nature; if they are 
segregated by being kept in separate accounts, 
they do not form part of a credit institution ’ s 
balance sheet. Investors have the right, even 
if it may be difﬁ  cult to exercise in practice, to 
take their securities outside the bankruptcy 
procedure. With respect to securities, it is 
crucial to have clear requirements for protecting 
customer assets because customers must not 
be treated as creditors if the entity holding 
the securities becomes insolvent. National 
legislation ensures protection of client’s assets 
for deposit activities and broadly reﬂ  ects the 
CPSS-IOSCO considerations. Harmonisation 
provisions are found in the MiFID. Therefore, 
to a large extent, the MiFID and national 
legislation can be primarily relied on for 
customer asset protection.
4.5  RECOMMENDATION 17: TRANSPARENCY 
This recommendation urges CSDs and central 
c o u n t e r p a r t i e s  ( C C P s )  t o  p r o v i d e  m a r k e t  
participants with sufﬁ   cient information for 
t h e m  t o  i d e n t i f y  a n d  e v a l u a t e  a c c u r a t e l y  t h e  
risks and costs associated with using the CSD 
or CCP services. Such disclosure can promote 
competition between service providers, and 
may lead to lower costs and improved levels 
o f  s e r v i c e .  C S D s  ( a n d  C C P s )  s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  
market participants with a full and clear 
understanding of their rights and obligations, 
the rules, regulations and laws governing the 
system, their governance procedures, any risks 
arising either to participants or the operator, 
and any steps taken to mitigate those risks. The 
information should be provided via the internet 
in a commonly used language. CSDs (and 
CCPs) should periodically review the accuracy 
and completeness of disclosures.
Table 5 CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 12 and related legislation
Recommendation 12 CRD MiFID
Entities holding securities should employ 
procedures ensuring that all customer 
assets are appropriately accounted for and 
kept safe. This could be accomplished 
by “segregation” and by reconciling 
records with the issuer CSD. Other 
ways to safeguard or protect customers 
against misappropriation and theft include 
internal controls and insurance or other 
compensation schemes.
No explicit provision. Article 13 (7) and (8) of the MiFID require 
investment ﬁ  rms (i) to deposit customer 
funds in certain institutions, (ii) to choose 
regulated depositories for ﬁ  nancial 
instruments, and (iii) to keep appropriate 
records of ownership that ensure that the 
total of client assets corresponds to the 
amounts held for each individual client.
Entities holding securities (i) must ensure 
that procedures allow customer protection 
and that, where relevant, procedures are 
applicable to all upstream intermediaries 
in multi-tier holdings, and (ii) should be 
regulated and supervised.
No explicit provision.  Detailed investor protection in Article 
13 (7) and (8) of the MiFID and Level 
2 measures introduced by CESR on 
appropriate record-keeping and clarity 
of ownership identiﬁ  cation, clarity of 
responsibilities, and maintenance of 
written records.23
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Similarly, the CRD, Annex III, in accordance 
with Basel II, sets out requirements for the 
disclosure of key information to allow market 
participants to assess risk exposure. The risk 
e x p o s u r e  p o l i c y  m u s t  b e  p u b l i c l y  a v a i l a b l e .  
The EU provisions require disclosure of all 
categories of risks, and further qualitative 
disclosures as regards the management of 
certain speciﬁ  c risks such as credit risk.
Turning to the MiFID, it is recognised that the 
MiFID is imbued with a different philosophy 
than the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations. The 
MiFID provides for the supervisory control of 
speciﬁ   c risks instead of requiring their 
disclosure to customers or market participants 
in general.21 However, the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations envisage both supervisory 
control through disclosure of the supervisors’ 
answers (see key question 2 ) and disclosure.22
Regarding fees, the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation concerning the disclosure 
of information that allows market participants 
to evaluate the costs associated with the CCP 
and CSD services offered is rather general. The 
CRD, on the other hand, allows only general 
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  b e  d i s c l o s e d ,  i f  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  
more speciﬁ  c information would put the bank 
at a competitive disadvantage, provided that 
the reason why speciﬁ   c information is not 
disclosed is stated. Under the MiFID, there 
are no requirements regarding the disclosure 
of information on fees because Articles 27 and 
28 impose an obligation on investment ﬁ  rms to 
disseminate pre-trade information on quotes, 
and post-trade information regarding prices and 
volumes, for certain transactions in ﬁ  nancial 
instruments. 
This  CP S S- I O S C O  R eco mmen dati on  requires  
information to be publicly accessible, current, 
accurate and available in formats (e.g. language) 
that meet the needs of users. Similarly, under the 
CRD, institutions may provide the information 
o n  a  p u b l i c l y  a c c e s s i b l e  i n t e r n e t  w e b s i t e ,  o r  
i n  p u b l i c  r e g u l a t o r y  r e p o r t s .  I n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  
encouraged to provide all related information 
in one location and cross-refer to it in other 
sources. 
CSDs should provide accurate and complete 
information. Disclosures should be periodically 
reviewed to ensure they remain current. 
Similarly, credit institutions are required to 
frequently assess and update information which 
is disclosed at least annually. Furthermore, 
credit institutions must assess the need for more 
frequent disclosures. Consequently, there are 
strong similarities between this CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation and the relevant sections 
of the banking legislation so that the CPSS-
IOSCO priorities are addressed by the banking 
legislation. 
4.6  CPSS-IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
BANKING REGULATIONS
The above analysis shows that the risks that 
the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations address 
See Articles 19 (7), 13 (4) and (5), and the respective Level 2  21 
measures proposed by CESR. 
BIS (2002), “CPSS-IOSCO assessment methodology for  22 
‘Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems’”, Basel, 
November. 
Table 6 CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 17 and related legislation
Recommendation 17 CRD MiFID
CSDs and CCPs should provide market 
participants with sufﬁ  cient information for 
them to identify and evaluate accurately 
the risks and costs associated with using 
the CSD or CCP services. 
Disclosure of key information to allow 
market participants to assess risk exposure. 
Supervisory control of risks instead 
of disclosure to market participants in 
general.
Disclosure to allow participants to 
evaluate costs and risks as a result of their 
participation in the system.
General information if disclosure would 
put the bank at a competitive disadvantage.
No disclosure requirements regarding fees. 24
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are the same as those addressed by the banking 
regulations, although the scope of application 
and the philosophy differ at times. The main 
differences concern the nature and extent of 
credit granted by CSDs. Owing to the central 
f u n c t i o n  o f  C S D s  i n  s e c u r i t i e s  m a r k e t s  a n d  
the whole ﬁ   nancial system, which consists 
in keeping records of rights to securities, the 
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations foresee, 
unlike the banking legislation, that CSDs 
that extend credit to participants must control 
possible exposures by adopting various 
measures, including full collateralisation (with 
the application of haircuts) and setting limits on 
the extension of credit. Securities overdrafts are 
prohibited.
Banking legislation is calibrated to allow 
authorities, if they wish, to monitor intraday 
exposures as any other kind of credit exposure. 
As regards the rest of the recommendations, 
t h e  m a i n  e l e m e n t s  o f  s e c u r i t i e s  l e n d i n g ,  i . e .  
operational reliability, customer protection and 
transparency, are largely reﬂ  ected in the relevant 
regulations applicable to credit institutions 
and investment ﬁ  rms. Therefore, no additional 
measures are needed as regards entities with 
a banking licence, in order to observe the 
recommendations. 25
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5  COMPARISON OF OVERSIGHT 
REQUIREMENTS WITH NATIONAL 
REGULATIONS 
The oversight, supervisory and regulatory 
concerns in the ﬁ  eld of clearing and settlement 
are addressed across the EU by various national 
regulations. Some harmonisation has been 
achieved following implementation of EU 
Directives. However, differences persist as 
regards the scope of application of the national 
laws, the degree of cooperation with other 
EU authorities, supervisory intensity, and the 
enforcement powers of the relevant authorities. 
Furthermore, two different approaches have 
been followed by banking regulators and 
overseers of CSDs/ICSDs. While banking 
regulators rely to a large extent on banks’ own 
risk management policies and internal controls 
(which are subject to supervisory review), 
overseers of CSDs and ICSDs have precise risk 
mitigation requirements (e.g. collateralisation).
In this chapter, the relevant national regulations 
setting down super-equivalent requirements, as 
compared with the CPSS Recommendations 9, 
5 and 11, are reviewed. 
5.1  CREDIT, LIQUIDITY AND SETTLEMENT RISKS
The main oversight concern about credit risk is 
the possibility of spill-over from the core, typical 
banking business to the clearing and settlement 
business (Recommendation 9). As mentioned 
in Chapter 4, overseers address this concern by 
recommending that CSDs avoid taking credit and 
liquidity risks to the largest possible extent, and 
requiring those that are allowed to extend credit 
under national legislation to put in place precise 
ri s k  mi ti g a ti o n  m e as ur e s  ( i . e .  us e  o f  limi ts  o n  
credit exposures, collateralisation of exposures 
and regular review of the appropriateness of the 
measures taken). 
From this perspective, CSDs are subject to 
national regulations which are, in general, 
super-equivalent (i.e. stricter) or equivalent 
to the international benchmark set by 
Recommendation 9, although a certain degree 
of heterogeneity exists. For instance, CSDs may 
be completely prohibited by law from extending 
credit (e.g. in Estonia, Spain, Finland, the United 
Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia).23 Or 
they may be allowed to provide some settlement-
related credit (this is the case in the Czech 
Republic, Italy, Denmark and – limited to 
securities lending – Portugal), subject to certain 
conditions. For instance, in Italy, such credit can 
b e  e x t e n d e d  o n l y  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a d e q u a t e  
guarantees. A similar provision is to be 
introduced in Malta. In Portugal, where the 
CSD can only provide credit for settlement 
of securities-related transactions full 
collateralisation is required with a view to 
avoiding settlement failures.24
On the other hand, national banking legislation 
reﬂ   ects the harmonisation achieved following 
implementation of the relevant Directives (on 
capital requirements and large exposures). 
National banking legislation does not generally 
limit a bank’s right to extend credit to a speciﬁ  c 
p u r p o s e .  A s  s t a t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  4 ,  s p e c i ﬁ  c 
prudential requirements (concerning internal 
controls, organisation and governance), together 
with the relevant supervisory tools, ensure that 
oversight concerns are addressed.25 Moreover, in 
some cases, the supervisory framework explicitly 
takes into account the speciﬁ  c risks arising in 
the transactions-related business (see Table 2, 
Providing a credit facility is essential in order to ensure the  23 
smooth functioning of the settlement process. In the countries 
listed, the function is normally entrusted to a third party. In 
Spain, Article 56 of Royal Decree 116/1992 prohibits the CSD 
(Iberclear) from granting credit to its participants. As far as 
the cash leg settlement is concerned, since Iberclear settles in 
central bank money, intraday credit is provided by the Banco 
de España. In the case of Estonia, lending and guarantee 
transactions involving cash or securities are carried out by the 
Tallinn Stock Exchange, which owns the Estonian CSD. Like 
the other Baltic exchanges, Tallinn Exchange has become part 
of the Swedish OMX Group. The Swedish Exchange is also a 
CCP serving the securities market and thus is authorised to 
extend credit to its members.
Regulation 15/2000 CMVM, Article 17, paragraphs 2 and 4. 24 
In France, for instance, even if collateralisation is not a  25 
requirement, uncollateralised credit must remain within 
strict prudential limits. Collateralisation is a credit risk 
mitigation technique that is partly recognised by French law 
(cash and sovereign securities). In Luxembourg, in the case of 
uncollateralised credit, the banking supervisor has the power 
to prescribe a higher solvency ratio than the minimum 8%.26
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Annex I). For instance, in France, banks that 
provide settlement guarantees are required to 
have speciﬁ  c procedures in place and to measure 
liquidity and settlement risk arising from the 
investment and clearing services provided. 
National banking regulations also apply to CSDs 
in countries where the central depositories 
operate on the basis of a banking licence. 
In the four cases where banking legislation 
applies to CSDs (Austria, Belgium, Germany 
and Luxembourg), the regulatory framework 
is identical, because the general (harmonised) 
rules on prudential supervision apply, including 
risk mitigation techniques and procedures. 
In these four countries, the application of the 
prudential supervision framework ensures that 
the bank CSD does not assume credit risks that 
it is unable to manage either in nature, size or 
complexity. In practice, however, differences 
subsist that are partly regulation-driven and 
partly market-driven. By way of example, the 
Austrian CSD is allowed to grant credit only in 
relation to certain activities and the credit is fully 
collateralised by the Austrian Government. In 
the case of Euroclear Bank, credit positions are 
highly collateralised owing to both supervisory 
requirements and market-led demands. In 
addition, liquidity management has been 
added to the oversight activities of the relevant 
authorities. Finally, it is worth mentioning that 
as  part  o f  th eir  risk  manag emen t  procedures,  
the two ICSDs voluntarily limit their banking 
s e r v i c e s  t o  a c t i v i t i e s  r e l a t e d  t o  s e t t l e m e n t  o r  
asset management, either in accordance with 
their constitution or on a de facto basis.
Credit risk can also be assumed in the context 
of  securities lending (Recommendation 5; 
see Chapter 4). The recommendation states 
that securities lending and borrowing should 
be encouraged as a method of expediting the 
settlement of securities transactions and that 
barriers that inhibit the practice of securities 
lending should be removed.
The general environment in the Member States 
is now relatively favourable to securities lending 
and borrowing as a method for enhancing 
settlement efﬁ   ciency and minimising the 
materialisation of settlement risks. 
National regulations applicable to CSDs have 
different approaches (see Table 7). CSDs with 
a banking licence are obviously allowed to 
provide securities lending facilities and to take 
on credit risk (in some cases by guaranteeing 
a minimum return on the transaction, or by 
taking responsibility vis-à-vis the lender for the 
proper conclusion of the lending operation). In 
the case of CSDs without a banking licence, 
securities lending is possible in order to support 
settlement, but the role played by the CSD may 
vary from case to case. For example:
– According to the Portuguese Securities 
Code (Article 280, paragraph 3a), the 
settlement system operator should put in 
place procedures to be followed in the event 
o f  d e f a u l t ,  n a m e l y  s e c u r i t i e s  l e n d i n g  a n d  
borrowing. 
Table 7 National regulations on credit risk 
(general provisions)
Banks
The limitations envisaged in Standard 9 are not 
conceptually applicable to banks owing to the 
different supervisory approach. However, the 
prudential supervisory framework ensures that 
overseers’ concerns are met.
In some cases, national legislation sets down 




With a banking licence:
Fall under national banking law (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg).
Without a banking licence:
Different regimes, ranging from a complete 
prohibition (Estonia, Spain, Finland, the 
United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia) to restrictions allowing only some 
settlement-related credit, (the Czech Republic, 
Italy, Denmark and – limited to securities 
lending – Portugal), often supplemented by a 
collateralisation requirement.27
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–  In other countries (the Czech Republic, Italy, 
Denmark, Poland  26 and Slovenia), national 
law  permits the CSD to provide such 
facilities  27  (although in some countries, e.g. 
Denmark and Slovenia, there is a lack of a 
business case for the CSD to operate in this 
ﬁ  eld, and securities lending is carried out 
bilaterally by the market participants). 
–  In Lithuania, the CSD is prohibited, under 
national legislation, from acting as principal 
in securities lending (securities lending 
is carried out by market participants on a 
bilateral basis).
In the absence of explicit legal provisions, 
national legislation (such as tax or insurance 
legislation) or SSS rules may encourage or, on 
the contrary, discourage securities lending: 
–  In Finland, Sweden and Spain, the tax 
legislation is favourable, under certain 
conditions, to securities lending. In Sweden, 
even if the national law does not contain any 
text expressly encouraging or discouraging 
securities lending, the rules applicable 
to SSSs provide positive incentives for 
participants to use this facility, in order to 
fulﬁ  l their delivery obligations.
–  In Belgium, tax neutrality is not assured for 
stock lending unless the service is organised 
by a recognised lending system under the 
conditions set out in the Income Tax Code. 
In the United Kingdom, insurance rules 
require that insurance companies know the 
identity of the counterparty to any stock 
lending transaction, which may cause 
problems as regards participation in certain 
automated stock lending transactions where 
the counterparty’s identity is not known 
(the latter rules can be waived if proved to 
be unduly burdensome, as per Financial 
Services Authority requirements).
The assessment methodology of CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendation 5 speciﬁ   es within its key 
issues that supervisors and overseers should have 
policies and procedures in place to ensure that 
risks stemming from securities lending activities 
are appropriately managed by entities subject 
to their oversight.28 The soundness, safety and 
efﬁ   ciency of securities lending arrangements 
is addressed by national banking legislation as 
regards credit risk and internal control.
Custodians’ risk management policies, 
particularly as regards large intraday credit 
exposures directly resulting from their clearing 
and settlement activities, may in some markets 
o r  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  b e c o m e  r e l e v a n t  f r o m  a n  
oversight perspective. The CPSS-IOSCO report 
acknowledges the diversity of institutional 
arrangements in place and states that, where 
custodian banks perform functions that can be 
considered equivalent to those of CSDs (internal 
settlement in their books without forwarding 
instructions to the CSD), the need may arise to 
apply to custodian banks some of the 
recommendations addressed to CSDs. 
T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  e n c o u r a g e s  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t i e s  
regulators, banking supervisors and overseers 
to work together to determine the scope of 
application of the recommendations more 
In Poland, the CSD can act only as agent, organising and  26 
managing an automated securities lending and borrowing 
system for transactions concluded on the regulated market.
In Malta, a new SSS is currently being drawn up based on  27 
CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations.
See key issue 3 in BIS (2002), p. 10. 28 
Table 8 National regulations on credit 
risk assumed in the context of securities 
lending
Banks 
Fall under the general banking 
regulations on credit risk.
CSDs/ICSDs With a banking licence:
Fall under national banking law 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany and 
Luxembourg).
Without a banking licence:
Different approaches:
o   CSD is explicitly required to set up a 
system (Portugal);
o   CSD is allowed to provide the facility 
(the Czech Republic, Italy, Denmark*, 
Poland and Slovenia*);
o   CSD is prohibited from assuming 
principal risk (Lithuania**).
*Due to the lack of a business case, there is no centralised facility 
in Denmark.
**Securities lending takes place on a bilateral basis.28
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appropriate to the speciﬁ   c local market 
conditions.29 I n  2 0 0 4  t h e  r e l e v a n t  E u r o p e a n  
authorities (the ESCB and CESR) looked into 
this issue, with particular reference to the 
possible application of some of the 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  s o m e  c u s t o d i a n s  o f  
systemic relevance (see ESCB-CESR (2004) 
and ECB (2005)). In that context, they 
committed to further study some important 
open issues in cooperation with market 
participants before taking any implementation 
measure. One of the open issues studied, which 
is elaborated upon in this paper as a contribution 
to the European debate, is the relationship 
between the banking supervisory framework 
and those oversight requirements dealing with 
credit risk (Recommendation 9). The 
comparative analysis of oversight and national 
supervisory requirements reported in Annex I 
shows that existing banking regulations 
adequately cover these risks and are in many 
respects super-equivalent to the requirements 
of Recommendation 9. It should be remembered 
th a t,  in  m o s t  c o un tri e s ,  th e  r e vi e w  o f  b anks ’  
r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l i c i e s  i s  a  s u p e r v i s o r y  
requirement. The relevant authorities’ powers 
in this ﬁ  eld are far-reaching; they may carry out 
on-site inspections, discuss relevant issues with 
the management of the supervised entities, and 
require detailed information to be provided. 
Furthermore, it is open to banking supervisors 
to require various corrective measures to be 
adopted (e.g. including, without necessarily 
being limited to, requiring the bank to increase 
the level of collateralisation). Hence, it can be 
concluded that oversight concerns are largely 
addressed by national banking regulations. 
Therefore, European overseers could consider 
that, as the oversight concerns about custodian 
banks are addressed by national banking 
regulations, custodian banks’ risk management 
policies could be excluded from the scope of 
application of Recommendation 9.
5.2  OPERATIONAL RISK AND OPERATIONAL 
RELIABILITY
The national regulations in force in most of 
the Member States cover the subject matter of 
Recommendation 11 extensively. 
National regulations addressed to CSDs are 
very similar – in content and scope of the 
requirements – to the framework set up by 
Recommendation 11, although they take 
different forms (laws, regulations, supervisory 
or oversight recommendations or standards).30  
The only countries where the operational risk 
requirements are not a result of public authority 
intervention are Poland, where initiatives in 
this ﬁ  eld have been led directly by the CSD, and 
Slovenia, where it is a matter for the CSD itself 
(self-regulation).
In some countries (e.g. Spain, Italy), some 
of the governance issues addressed in the 
recommendation are already covered by 
national law.
See the introduction to BIS (2001), p. 2. 29 
For instance, in Spain, the legal framework sets down general  30 
requirements regarding operational risk, both for the CSD 
and its participants. In Finland, the Financial Supervision 
Authority has issued a guideline explicitly addressing risk 
management and other aspects of internal control in CSDs, and 
a recommendation on operational risk management. In Italy, 
speciﬁ  c supervisory instructions for CCPs and CSDs cover this 
subject, while in Belgium a draft Royal Decree (in application 
of the Law of August 2002 on the control of ﬁ  nancial markets, 
giving the CBFA responsibility for the prudential control of 
settlement institutions) will set down requirements for CSDs 
without a banking licence similar to those already in place for 
bank CSDs.29
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As far as banks are concerned, the relevant 
operational risk supervisory framework is: 
(1)  relatively harmonised, as a result of 
implementation of the Basel Committee’s 
best practices in national banking 
regulations;
(2)  equivalent and, in some respects, 
super-equivalent to the provisions of 
Recommendation 11.
In general, overseers’ concerns about the monitoring 
and assessment of sources of operational risk are 
met by national provisions requiring the adequate 
organisation of banking activity (which needs to be 
assessed taking into account the degree of 
complexity and scope of the bank’s business), risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  p o l i c i e s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t s .  
This is the case in Belgium,31 Germany,32 France,33 
Hungary,34 Lithuania, Latvia and Luxembourg. 
In some countries, banks operating in the 
settlement and custody business are subject to 
additional requirements: 
– in Finland, the Financial Supervision 
A u t h o r i t y  s t a n d a r d  o n  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  
operational risk (which entered into force 
at the beginning of 2005) is binding on 
custodian banks, while it applies to the CSD 
in the form of a recommendation;
–  in Italy, banks must adopt speciﬁ  c  rules 
governing the system of internal controls, 
which must take into account all categories 
of risks (operational and settlement risks in 
particular); 
–  in Austria, where the CSD has a banking 
licence, operational reliability obligations 
Article 20 of the Banking Law. Further regulatory provisions  31 
are contained in CBF A Circular D 1 97/4 on internal control 
and internal audits. 
Article 25a of the Banking Act, and the Auditors’ Report  32 
Regulation.
Regulation 97-02, in particular Article 32, deals speciﬁ  cally  33 
with the operational risks faced by banks, irrespective of the 
activities they stem from.
In Hungary, the Act on Credit Institutions and Financial  34 
Enterprises and the Act on Capital Markets provide for the 
protection of information technology systems. A government 
decree further details the requirements applicable to payment 
and securities clearing and settlement systems.
Table 9 National regulations on operational risk
Issue Banking regulation CSD regulation
Framework Legal provisions
Supervisory recommendations for CSDs 
and their participants (e.g. Finland)
Legal provision (Spain, Belgium, 
Germany, France, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Luxembourg).
Speciﬁ  c instructions for non-bank CSDs 
and CCP (e.g. Italy).
Self-regulation (e.g. Poland and Slovenia).
Capital requirements Harmonised framework CSDs with banking licence (same as 
banks). In some countries there are capital 
requirements for CSDs (own funds, 
reserves, retained earnings, net income in 
addition to the initial capital)
Proportionality No speciﬁ  c national requirement No speciﬁ  c national requirement
Minimisation of operational risk Relatively harmonised framework. 
Additional requirements for banks in 
Finland, Italy and Austria (under oversight 
framework), and Belgium (detailed 
recommendations).
Outsourcing Germany: ex-ante notiﬁ  cation 
requirements
Finland: information to FSA
Italy and Belgium: speciﬁ  c risk control 
measures
France: authorities allowed to supervise 
any outsourced activity directly
Explicit requirements in Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Finland and Spain.
No legal provision in Austria, Czech 
Republic, Italy and Latvia.
Forbid outsourcing (Hungary and 
Slovenia).30
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stem, in general, from Article 44a of the 
National Banking Act. However, as far 
as the clearing and settlement process 
is speciﬁ   cally concerned, operational 
risk is a matter under the responsibility 
of the national central bank, which is in 
charge of payment systems oversight 
(since 1 April 2002). 
However, no super-equivalent banking 
legislation is in force in Spain and Ireland.
In many countries, the requirement to ensure 
adequate levels of business continuity and 
disaster recovery is the subject of super-
equivalent banking provisions. For instance:
–   in  S p a in,  di s as t e r  r e c o v e ry  p l ans  m us t  b e  
checked at least every six months;
– regular assessment of disaster recovery 
plans in the light of business continuity risks 
is also required in France; 
–  in Italy, the authorities may set more stringent 
requirements for banks and ﬁ  nancial 
in term edi ari es  tha t  p l a y  an  important role in 
payment and settlement systems, compared with 
the business continuity guidelines generally 
applicable to banks; 
–  in Belgium, the Financial Stability 
Committee has issued detailed 
recommendations applicable to all 
systemically critical institutions that should 
be implemented by 2007.
Finally, as far as outsourcing is concerned, in 
the case of CSDs/CCPs:
–  regulations expressly covering outsourcing 
are in place in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Finland, Spain and France, which are 
generally equivalent to Recommendation 
11 (in Spain and France with the exception 
of the approval/notiﬁ  cation  requirement), 
although they vary in the details from 
country to country; 
– there are currently no speciﬁ  c  legal 
provisions on outsourcing i n  A u s t r i a ,  t h e  
Czech Republic, Italy (here the authorities 
have considered issuing guidelines on this 
topic) and Latvia (where the introduction 
of a requirement to provide information is 
currently being considered);
–  ﬁ  nally, in Slovenia and Hungary (although 
the rule is currently being reconsidered in 
Hungary), only CSDs are permitted to carry 
out activities related to securities clearing and 
settlement, hence prohibiting outsourcing.
Banks, on the other hand, are subject to various 
supervisory requirements on outsourcing, 
which are considered to fully meet the oversight 
concerns. For example:
–  in Germany , although ex ante supervisory 
approval is not required, an ex ante 
notiﬁ   cation requirement means that the 
authority can take appropriate measures in 
the event the outsourcing contract does not 
satisfy the provisions laid down in Banking 
Circular 11/2001;
– in Finland, the Financial Supervision 
Authority has the power to obtain 
information from, and perform on-site 
inspections at, the companies handling the 
outsourced activities;
–  in Italy, custodian banks must adopt speciﬁ  c 
m e a s u r e s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  o u t s o u r c e d  
activities. Moreover, the outsourcing bank 
remains fully responsible for the outsourced 
activities;
–  in France, the outsourcing contract between 
the bank and the third party must allow 
the authorities to supervise directly (for 
example, through on-site inspections) any 
outsourced activity;
–  in Belgium, the subject is covered in detail.35
The principles set out in the national rules 
CBFA Circular PPB 2204/5. 35 31
ECB
Occasional Paper No 76
December 2007





cover governance and policy aspects, 
responsibility preservation, choice of 
supplier and continuity, service level 
agreements, cascade outsourcing, internal 
audits and compliance, external audits and 
prudential control. 
The current supervisory practices and 
approaches as regards outsourcing, as well as 
the common policies that have been elaborated 
to date in the various Member States, form the 
basis for the “High Level Principles on 
Outsourcing” drawn up by the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)  36  with 
a view to fostering further regulatory 
convergence at European level.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the international 
recommendations for securities settlement 
systems, the EU legislative framework, and 
the comparison of national implementation 
measures show that overseers and regulators 
share largely the same concerns regarding 
the safe and efﬁ   cient management of risks. 
Their approaches may vary from country to 
country if the same function is performed 
by a different type of entity. This may reﬂ  ect 
historical differences of the development 
of EU markets because the national 
framework has been developed to meet the 
different needs of the national markets at various 
points in time. While the analysis suggests 
that the current regulatory and operational 
framework is equipped with tools to monitor 
t h e  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  i n s t i t u t e d  b y  v a r i o u s  
entities from the point of view of ﬁ  nancial 
stability, there are other speciﬁ  c  challenges 
that overseers and regulators are called to 
cope with. 
First, cross-border groups are increasingly 
integrating several business functions 
across borders and legal entities. Similarly, 
infrastructures increasingly seize business 
opportunities by extending services to 
geographic markets outside their location or 
developing new products outside the traditional 
market segments. In this context, the process 
of ﬁ  nancial integration is confronted with the 
increasing importance of systemic risk and at 
the same time with the territorial application 
and enforcement of the risk management 
framework.
Second, while advanced technology helps 
simplifying procedures and reducing costs, 
technological innovation is largely developed by 
new types of entities which may not always ﬁ  t 
within the traditional distinctions of supervised 
entities. As a result, the distinction between 
banks and non banks may be blurred owing to 
the fact that the same service can be offered by 
specialised entities. 
Third, the initiation by the Eurosystem of 
an investigation into possibly providing 
settlement services for securities transactions 
(the “TARGET2 Securities” project) provides 
an impetus for the operational integration of 
clearing and settlement to which regulatory 
attention will have to be devoted.
Fourth, alongside payment systems, 
correspondent banking arrangements still 
play a signiﬁ  cant role. For example, a recent 
CPSS study on FX settlement risk has shown 
that in 2006 on a worldwide basis 32% of FX 
obligations were settled through correspondent 
banking. Correspondent banking has become 
more and more a specialised banking service, 
both cross-border and domestic (including 
agency arrangements and provision of indirect 
a c c e s s  t o  IF T S  f o r  c us t o m e r  b anks ) ,  wi th  an  
increasing concentration in some major market 
players offering a broad range of settlement-
related services. This concentration increases 
the dependence of a larger number of banks on a 
See Committee of European Banking Supervisors (2004),  36 
Annual Report, pp. 15-16 and p. 25. Work in this ﬁ  eld by the 
European supervisory authorities was already underway in 2002. 
A public consultation on the CEBS “High Level Principles” was 
carried out in 2004. CEBS is considering the need to coordinate 
its approach to outsourcing with similar exercises carried out 
by CESR, CEIOPS (the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisors) and the Joint Forum at the 
global level. At the time of writing, a second consultation round 
was envisaged following further work on this issue.32
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few service-providing institutions as well as the 
dependence of IFTS on a few large participants, 
settling for a high number of smaller banks. 
Moreover, with a higher degree of concentration, 
the potential for internalisation of payment 
ﬂ   ows in the books of these major players 
increases. There might be a danger that some 
r i s k s  t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  e l i m i n a t e d  f r o m  f o r m a l  
payment systems might reappear in the market 
in payment arrangements offered by banks. 
For example, while the ﬁ  nality of payments is 
well-deﬁ  ned in the case of payment systems, 
this may not always be true for correspondent 
banking arrangements. In addition, it is not 
excluded that bilateral netting between banks 
may play a more prominent role in the future. 
These risks, although they are part of banks ’ 
daily business, might be of concern if 
d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  t h e  m a r k e t  w e r e  t o  i n d i c a t e  
that there is a potential for payment systems 
to be crowded out by in-house arrangements. 
Moreover, excessive concentration of business 
in a few entities may result in an excessive 
concentration of risks, and transform some 
institutions in “single points of failure” whose 
stability would be essential for the stability of 
the rest of the system. This may, in turn, create 
serious moral hazard problems. 
The EU Capital Requirements Directive covers 
the issue of avoiding excessive concentration 
of exposures vis-à-vis a single institution or a 
group of related institutions (conglomerate). 
Fifth, the monitoring and mitigation of 
both intraday exposures and intraday credit 
granted by individual service-providing 
banks has gained importance. During the day, 
correspondent banks appear to offer intraday 
credit to their customer banks, whereby 
exposures can be quite signiﬁ   cant and seem 
t o  b e  o n l y  p a r t l y  c o l l a t e r a l i s e d .  T h i s  c r e d i t  
would be, in theory, bound by counterparty 
limits, although it is not clear how hard these 
limits are and how quickly they can be adjusted 
when required. Intraday exposures should 
be considered in any respect as a form of 
liquidity risk and credit risk. Because if at the 
end of the day this credit is not reimbursed it 
will automatically spill-over into overnight 
credit and has the potential to create signiﬁ  cant 
liquidity and/or credit problems at the end of 
the day, when market and systems are going 
to close and it can be more difﬁ  cult to take the 
appropriate measures to ﬁ  nance the position in 
the market. Against this background, it is not 
clear if appropriate measures are in place to 
prevent a spill-over of potentially huge intraday 
exposures into overnight exposures and which 
consequences this may have.
The BCBS has provided some guidance for 
banks on liquidity management and intraday 
liquidity in “Sound practices for managing 
liquidity in banking organisations” (2000) 
and set up a Working Group on Liquidity 
to analyse the supervision and regulation of 
liquidity risks in its members’ jurisdictions. 
In parallel, individual G10 central banks are 
c l o s e l y  m o n i t o r i n g  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  
correspondent banking and are analysing 
intraday liquidity and collateral requirements 
stemming from recent developments in 
payment systems. In addition to these activities, 
it is worthwhile clarifying which rules and 
regulations addressing intraday liquidity 
management and intraday exposures, including 
those arising in correspondent banking 
relations, do already exist and whether there 
are any gaps that may call for a policy 
response. 
Against these ongoing developments for 
cross-border activities and in order to address 
regulatory concerns efﬁ  ciently and any liquidity 
problems that may be triggered in a cross-
border dimension by payment, clearing and 
settlement systems, overseers and regulators 
have established cooperative arrangements 
and memoranda of understanding to support 
the oversight of these infrastructures, enabling 
effective leverage over decisions that inﬂ  uence 
systemic risk in the respective countries. 
The current cooperative framework is 
developed on an ad hoc basis, when needed at 
the discretion of the authorities involved. The 33
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approach followed thus far has involved the 
development of procedures aimed at supporting 
the interaction between the different sets of 
authorities, in order to ensure the effective 
safeguarding of ﬁ   nancial stability in the 
single  ﬁ   nancial market. These procedures 
take account of the fact that the authorities, 
in the context of their responsibilities, need to 
retain the necessary discretion and ﬂ  exibility 
to tackle the speciﬁ   c aspects of a potential 
situation. Nevertheless, challenges are growing 
with ﬁ  nancial integration and business is not 
c o n t a i n e d  w i t h  n a t i o n a l  b o r d e r s .  T o  a d d r e s s  
this new operational dimension, a framework 
for enhancing cross-border and cross-sectoral 
cooperation among overseers and regulators 
would be the way forward.
In a cross-border dimension, both supervision 
and oversight cooperative frameworks 
should aim at responding to the increasing 
internationalisation of ﬁ  nancial  markets 
and institutions by enhancing supervisory 
arrangements that avoid gaps and reduce the 
risk of inconsistent policies, while eliminating 
unnecessary regulatory burdens.
Recent improvements in the institutional setting 
and present efforts to ensure their effective 
implementation should spur signiﬁ  cant progress 
in supervisory cooperation and convergence that 
is in line with the challenges posed by cross-
border activities. In particular, the supervisory 
framework can deliver an enhanced integrated 
supervisory interface for cross-border 
clearing and settlement, enabling operators to 
reduce their supervisory compliance burden 
signiﬁ  cantly.
Without prejudice to the existing responsibilities 
of home or host authorities - for systemically 
important payment and settlement systems – 
any further policy action to strengthen the EU 
cooperative framework for cross-border clearing 
and settlement could be considered after the 
review of the supervisory framework at the EU 
level by the end of 2007. 34
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ANNEXES
1 SUMMARY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION*
Table 1 CPSS-IOSCO Recommendation 9 – Credit risk
Standard provision Super-equivalent national legislation
CSDs that extend intraday credit to 
participants, including CSDs that operate 
net settlement systems, should institute 
risk controls that, at a minimum, ensure 
timely settlement in the event that the 
participant with the largest payment 
obligation is unable to settle. 
The most reliable set of controls is a 
combination of collateral requirements 
and limits.
In Denmark, any exposure should be mitigated by solvency ratios.
In the Czech Republic, loans must be “duly secured” – collateral is not explicitly mentioned.
In Portugal, where a CSD extends credit (which is only permitted for the purposes of 
avoiding settlement failures), full collateralisation is required.
In Malta, current practice is that the Exchange provides an uncollateralised overnight 
overdraft facility in order to ensure that the process of settlement continues unimpeded 
in the event of late settlement. While each “member”, in accordance with the Financial 
Markets Act, must deposit a certain capital amount in favour of the Exchange to be utilised 
should a member fail in its obligations to its clients, there is no correlation between this 
deposit and settlement exposures. While cash settlement occurs on a net basis – and 
therefore settlement exposures are effectively reduced – currently the Exchange is carrying 
settlement risk. This situation will be addressed as soon as the new SSS currently in draft 
form, which is based on CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations and standards, particularly with 
regard to DVP and ﬁ  nality, is implemented later this year. Furthermore, the new legislation 
which is being drafted includes relevant provisions on adequate collateral.
In Poland, the CSD operates an automatic securities lending system in which it acts as an 
intermediary. The loan is collateralised and it can be extended only within the liquidity-
securing system. The same rules apply to repo and on-request securities lending and 
borrowing organised by the CSD.
In France, collateral is not required for banks but is used for credit risk mitigation and is 
partly (cash and sovereign securities) recognised by regulation. Risks from uncollateralised 
credits must remain within the strict limits required by prudential regulation.
In Italy, the CSD may grant loans, including intraday credit in euro or foreign currency, on 
the basis of adequate guarantees. The CSD which manages the settlement services (gross 
or net) must adopt internal systems and controls aimed at ensuring the timely closing of the 
settlement, even in the event of default by one or more participants. This should be done in 
line with international standards.
In Estonia, in accordance with the Securities Market Act, the system operator is required to 
establish a guarantee fund in order to ensure execution of the obligations of the members in 
the system and of the system operator.
The United Kingdom was set to implement its own credit risk systems and control 
requirements. In some areas, the requirements may be super-equivalent to the Capital 
Requirements Directive.
In Luxembourg, the banking supervisor has the power to prescribe a higher banking ratio 
than the minimum of 8%.
In Hungary, the operator of the SSS is subject to prudential rules set out in the Act on Credit 
Institutions and Financial Enterprises, which is harmonised with the relevant EU legislation.
In Germany, collateralised credit has a more favourable treatment with regard to capital 
requirements and large exposure limits.
In Belgium, safe and sound risk management should be in place. The risk management 
procedure determines the most appropriate tools for risk mitigation. All exposures, 
collateralised or not, should be identiﬁ  ed, monitored and controlled.
In France, speciﬁ  c requirements apply, in terms of selection and measurement of 
intermediation risk, to banks which guarantee settlement of transactions. Banks should set 
up procedures to select, measure and assess exposure to each customer and the guarantees 
received by customers, taking into account the customer’s ﬁ  nancial situation. At least once 
a year, the internal (independent) controller draws up a report on internal control, and on 
the measurement and monitoring of the bank’s exposures (which is submitted to the Board/
auditors/central bank).
In Spain, entities should, according to the size of their business, establish “adequate accounting 
and administrative procedures and mechanisms for internal control with regard to the 
management, monitoring and control of interest and liquidity risks”. The Banco de España can 
then check a number of speciﬁ  c points as regards entities’ risk management policies.
In Slovenia, the regulator (in connection with the central bank) supervises banks’ 
operations relating to the provision of services involving securities.
* (Mid 2005)35
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In the Czech Republic, the CSD is operated by the national central bank. Under Article 43 
of the Capital Markets Act, the registration of securities and the operation of a settlement 
system for CSDs, as performed by the national bank, shall not be subject to licensing or 
State oversight.
In Malta, capital requirements are risk sensitive.
In Portugal, banks are required to submit an annual report on internal control to their 
regulator, describing the internal controls put in place in view of the nature of, and risks 
involved in, the activities conducted.
In France, the central bank ensures that the internal risk management policy of banks 
is adapted to the nature and volume of the banks’ activities, their size, the complexity of 
their operations and internal organisation, and the various types of risk to which they are 
exposed.
In Italy, custodian banks are monitored with respect to prudential regulation, internal 
systems and controls, and internal risk management procedures. The limits established 
must be monitored continuously, and reviewed periodically.
In Estonia, the Credit Institutions Act sets down the prudential limitations on 
concentrations of exposures of credit institutions.
In Germany, collateralised credit has a more favourable treatment with regard to capital 
requirements and large exposure limits.
In Belgium, safe and sound risk management should be in place. The risk management 
procedure determines the most appropriate tools for risk mitigation.
In Estonia, the Credit Institutions Act sets down the prudential limitations on 
concentrations of exposures of credit institutions.
Super-equivalent requirements on 
reporting to the relevant authorities on 
large settlement-related exposures
The United Kingdom has super-equivalent rules that require cases where exposures are set 
to exceed 25% to be pre-notiﬁ  ed.
In Spain, large exposures should be reported quarterly or every six months, depending on 
the (banking) entity. An exposure is considered large when its value is greater than 10% of 
own funds. IBERCLEAR sends the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), 
on a daily basis, details of pending settlements, corresponding to every participant of its 
Servicios de Compensación y Liquidación de Valores (SCLV) platform.
In Germany, it is necessary to report large end-of-day exposures, according to current 
banking regulations. However, the limits on large exposures also apply to intraday 
exposures.
In France, banks must comply with the requirements in respect of large exposures, and 
quarterly reports are submitted to the central bank.
In Belgium, all exposures to a single counterparty should be limited to 25% of own funds 
of the credit institution, and the cumulative amount of all exposures should be limited to 
800%. All large exposures and concentrations should be reported. Ad hoc reporting can be 
deﬁ  ned by the  CBFA.
In Austria, large exposures are deﬁ  ned as 10% of own funds (and must exceed EUR 
500,000).
In Italy, the Banca d’Italia monitors large exposures of the CCP’s and CSD’s participants 
on the proprietary and customer accounts through its connection to the internal system of 
the Italian CCP and CSD.36
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Country Permitted Not permitted Comments
United Kingdom ✔
No speciﬁ  c provisions on the granting of credit by CSDs. CSDs do not 
currently provide credit.
Portugal ✘ CSDs may only grant credit in order to avoid settlement failures.
Czech Republic ✔
Loans to participants should be duly secured, and for the purpose of 
settlement.
Hungary ✔
CSDs are permitted to act as principal in securities lending; therefore, it 
follows that CSDs are also permitted to extend credit.
Poland ✔
A CSD can grant cash loans to participants to the extent necessary to fulﬁ  l its 
core activities (custody, clearing and settlement); however, CSDs do not use 
this prerogative.
Malta ✘
Legislation in respect of CSDs is currently in draft form. CSDs generally act 
as a central registration system.
Spain ✘
The Spanish legal system does not permit CSDs to grant credit to their 
participants.
Germany ✔
German CSDs are licensed as banks and therefore normal banking regulations 
apply.
Latvia ✘ CSDs are prohibited by law from extending credit. 
Lithuania ✘
CSDs are prohibited by law from granting credit to market participants, and 
acting as principal in securities lending.
Belgium ✔
Supervision framework for credit institutions and settlement institutions 
is based on banking regulations and legislation on the control of ﬁ  nancial 
markets.
Luxembourg ✔ Luxembourg-based ICSD is licensed as a bank.
France ✔
Slovenia ✔
CSDs may also provide other services with regard to securities transactions, 
meeting obligations and exercising rights arising from securities; they are not 
explicitly mentioned, but not forbidden either.
Ireland ✔ Permitted although not stated explicitly. CSDs currently do not provide credit.
Slovakia ✔
CSDs are permitted by law to grant credit or loans to a client to allow it to 
carry out a transaction, although they do not do so in practice. Securities 
lending (as principal) is considered a secondary activity, and must be 
explicitly stated in the CSD licence (approved by the regulator).
Austria ✔
CSDs administer the export ﬁ  nancing scheme (risk free as security is 
provided by the Austrian Government). Clearing and settlement is not 
considered a banking activity under Austrian law.
Sweden
Finland ✘ According to the Finnish Securities Market Act, a CSD may not issue credit.
Greece
Cyprus
Netherlands ✘ CSDs are not allowed to run any commercial risk.
Denmark ✔
CSDs do not extend credit (i.e. settlement is in central bank money); 
however, they are permitted to do so under the Danish Securities Trading Act.
Italy ✔
Credit activities are limited to enabling participants to settle positions. Loans 
may be granted in euro or foreign currency, including intraday credit, based 
on adequate guarantees.
Estonia ✘ CSDs are not allowed to engage in lending and guarantee transactions of both 
securities and cash (although the Estonian Stock Exchange, which acts as 
CCP and owns the CSD, is permitted to do so).37
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Provision Equivalent and super-equivalent national legislation
Securities lending and borrowing (or repurchase 
agreements and other economically equivalent 
transactions) should be encouraged as a method for 
expediting the settlement of securities transactions.
UK insurance rules require that insurance companies know the identity of 
the counterparty to any stock lending transaction. This can cause problems as 
regards participation in certain automated stock lending transactions where the 
counterparty’s identity is not known. These rules can however be waived, in 
the event compliance would be unduly burdensome, as per Financial Services 
Authority requirements.
In Sweden, the rules and regulations of the SSS include sanctions for those 
participants which do not deliver on time, therefore encouraging timely 
settlement. There is no text in Swedish law encouraging securities lending to 
expedite securities settlement.
Barriers that inhibit the practice of lending securities 
for this purpose should be removed.
In Finland, capital transfer tax may, in certain cases, inhibit securities 
lending.
In Belgium, as concerns stock lending, tax neutrality is not assured for 
borrowers unless the transaction is organised by a recognised lending system 
in compliance with the Income Tax Code.
Super-equivalent provisions relevant for securities lending and control of risks taken by participants:
In the UK, stock lending of private customers’ assets is covered by the 
Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS). Article 2.5 states that “if a safe custody 
investment belonging to a private customer is used for stock lending activity, 
the ﬁ  rm must ensure that relevant collateral is provided by the borrower 
in favour of the customer”. Furthermore, “the level and type of collateral 
required should take account of the creditworthiness of the borrower and the 
market risks associated with the particular collateral”.
In Finland, the general terms of lending agreements must be approved by the 
Financial Supervision Authority (FSA). The CSD is only allowed to clear and 
settle lending agreements, the terms of which have been approved by the FSA.
In Sweden, there is no central securities lending institution and securities 
are lent bilaterally. However, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, 
Finansinspektionen, supervises the risk management systems of the individual 
institutions.38
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Provision Equivalent and super-equivalent  national legislation
Sources of operational risk 
arising in the clearing and 
settlement process should 
be identiﬁ  ed and minimised 
through the development of 
appropriate systems, controls 
and procedures.
Systems should be reliable 
and secure, and have 
adequate, scalable capacity.
In Germany, the provisions of the Banking Act are broad, thus enabling a ﬂ  exible interpretation 
according to the size and signiﬁ  cance of the business, and in line with the principle that the main 
responsibility for risk management should lie with the supervised institution. Further details on the 
institutions’ speciﬁ  c organisational duties are contained in Article 25a of the Banking Act.
In Portugal, banks are required by the Banco de Portugal to submit an annual internal controls report, 
which should follow the principles of the “Sound practices for the management and supervision of 
operational risks” issued by the Basel Committee.
In Poland, the development of the CSD’s system is subject to strict regulation relating to, for example, 
procurement, scope of the system and its modiﬁ  cation. The control procedures include the following:
- functional analysis;
- initial project;
- detailed speciﬁ  cation;
- building of the system;
- testing; and
- implementation.
Speciﬁ  c additional requirements also apply to custodian banks concerning their IT systems, and other 
internal systems and controls.
In France, there are speciﬁ  c requirements on computer security and appropriate information systems.
In Italy, the supervisory instructions for CSDs and CCPs, issued by the Banca d’Italia and Consob 
(Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa), provide that the Board of Directors shall send the 
authorities an annual report concerning, inter alia, the structure of the system of internal controls, and 
the methods adopted to identify, monitor and solve any operational shortcomings.
The system of internal controls and the speciﬁ  c procedures regarding operational risk, adopted by 
CSDs and CCPs, are periodically assessed by the authorities.
The Board of Auditors shall send the authorities an annual report on the outcome of the controls 
performed, and as regards the system’s operational reliability. Moreover, at least once a year, CSDs and 
CCPs shall test the technological and IT structures with special reference to the IT security measures 
adopted, and the backup and recovery procedures put in place. The testing should be conducted by third 
parties or by internal units, provided that the latter are independent from the production units.
Contingency plans and 
backup facilities should 
be established to allow for 
timely recovery of operations 
and completion of the 
settlement process.
In Spain, disaster recovery plans must be checked at least every six months.
In Lithuania, the operator of the SSS should have a business continuity plan, but there are no guidelines 
as to its appropriate content.
In France, banks must have a business continuity plan and ensure that their organisation and resources 
(staff, real estate, technical and ﬁ  nancial) are regularly assessed in the light of business continuity risks. 
In Belgium, the Financial Stability Committee published general recommendations in October 2004, 
with the aim of achieving harmonisation in terms of recovery and resumption time objectives. The 
recommendations should be implemented in 2007 and are applicable to all systemically critical 
institutions.
Principles:
•   Resumption: The objective is to enable a restart of activities before the end of the day, even if it is 
necessary to extend the normal operating hours in the event that an incident happens at the end of the 
day. 
•   Recovery: The objective is to achieve a Recovery Time Objective (RTO) of two hours after an 
incident occurs. For less critical institutions, the RTO can be extended to a maximum of four hours.
•  A sufﬁ  cient distance should be maintained between production and backup data centres in order 
to avoid that both could be impacted by one single incident. The idea is not to determine a speciﬁ  c 
distance (at the discretion of each institution) but rather to ensure that data centres are located in 
places with different risk proﬁ  les.
•   The cooperation of telecommunication companies is requested as regards transparency of information, 
so as to enable critical institutions to plan the installation of their connections and avoid so-called 
“single points of failure”.
•   Regular internal testing should be carried out, at least once a year. Bilateral testing with core 
counterparties is also important, notably to ensure the switch between primary and backup data 
centres.
•   Critical institutions should develop disaster recovery plans that satisfy the following ﬁ  ve conditions: 
(1) a short RTO; (2) high recovery point objectives to ensure an accepted level of data loss; (3) 
transparency for users in terms of switching between data centres; (4) adequate transaction storage on 
the user’s side, at least during the RTO, plus a security margin, to facilitate the recovery process; and 
(5) adequate capacity of the backup data centre.39
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In Italy, speciﬁ  c business continuity guidelines for banks have recently been issued concerning 
emergency situations and the resumption of normal operating conditions. According to these guidelines, 
banks are obliged to deﬁ  ne business continuity plans and take all the necessary initiatives to ensure 
operational reliability no later than December 2006.
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FROM THE EXPLANATORY TEXT OF CPSS-IOSCO RECOMMENDATION 11
3.57 There should be 
adequate management 
controls and sufﬁ  cient 
(and sufﬁ  ciently well 
qualiﬁ  ed) personnel to 
ensure that procedures are 
implemented accordingly. 
Risks, operational policies 
and procedures, and 
systems should be reviewed 
periodically and after 
modiﬁ  cations to the system. 
Information systems should 
be subject to periodic 
independent audit, and 
external audits should be 
seriously considered.
In Malta, the Exchange’s annual external audit explicitly includes a review of recovery procedures.
In Spain, in accordance with the functioning and organisation regulations, a Technical Commission, 
which reports to the Board of Directors and to the President, is in charge of the review and assessment 
of the technical systems.
In Slovenia, in exercising control of the Stock Exchange, the Central Securities Clearing Corporation 
Inc. (KDD) may require that the Stock Exchange carry out a special audit of information systems and 
internal controls, and submit a report.
In France, the Board of Directors should review the activities and results of the internal control system 
at least twice a year.
In Belgium, the Executive Committee should set up an adequate internal control system and ensure that 
it is assessed at least every year. The Executive Committee should report to the Board of Directors at 
least once a year, through the audit committee, if one exists.
3.59 Some clearing and 
settlement operations may be 
outsourced to third parties. 
In these circumstances, 
operational risk will reside 
with the outside service 
provider. System operators 
who outsource operations 
should ensure that those 
operations meet the same 
standards as if they were 
provided directly by the 
system operator.
In Germany, Banking Circular 11/2001 explains the provisions on outsourcing in more detail. The pre-
notiﬁ  cation requirement ensures that the Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) can take appropriate 
measures if the outsourcing contract does not comply with the requirements laid down in the Circular. 
Furthermore, under the Banking Act, the institution outsourcing should ensure that it has the necessary 
contractual powers to give instructions to the external service provider in question, and shall include 
the outsourced areas in its monitoring procedures.
In Finland, the Financial Supervision Authority has the right to obtain information and perform on-site 
inspections at the companies handling the outsourced activity.
In Lithuania, the operator of the SSS should inform the Bank of Lithuania when outsourcing its 
services. Although not mentioned explicitly in national legislation, the Bank of Lithuania could ask for 
additional information from the SSS operator.
In Italy, the authorities have considered issuing guidelines concerning outsourcing with a view to 
managing and controlling risks arising from outsourced activities. In particular, CSDs and CCPs would 
be invited to regulate outsourcing relationships in written contracts (service level agreements) which 
would state explicitly that the authorities would be allowed to exercise their supervisory powers with 
regard to the outsourced activities (i.e. by means of access to information, or requesting corrective 
measures).
For custodian banks, speciﬁ  c measures must be adopted with regard to outsourced activities. The 
outsourcing bank remains fully answerable and responsible for any activity outsourced.
In particular, general prudential measures are provided in terms of: (a) outsourcing goals; (b) 
assessment and selection of service providers; (c) assessment of the organisational arrangements 
and staff availability of the service provider; (d) contractual arrangements that enable, inter alia, the 
banking supervisor to carry out its functions; and (e) proper service level agreements that deﬁ  ne the 
obligations of the service providers.
In France, the outsourcing contract between the bank and third party must allow the central bank to 
supervise directly any outsourced activity, including by means of on-site inspections.
In Belgium, a number of principles for outsourcing are covered by CBFA Circular PPB 2204/5.
Principle 1: Outsourcing policy deﬁ  nition
Each institution must deﬁ  ne an outsourcing policy that must be approved by the Board. This policy 
should take into account all the principles described in the Circular and clearly deﬁ  ne the decision-
making process for outsourcing activities.
Principle 2: Responsibility preservation
Outsourcing does not reduce the management responsibility of the institutions, neither with respect to 
their stockholders or clients, nor with respect to their prudential authorities or supervisors.40
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Principle 3: Outsourcing decision
The decision should be made on the basis of a formal and well-documented analysis. This analysis 
should comprise, at least: (1) an exhaustive description of the services or activities that are outsourced; 
(2) the expected effects of outsourcing – including a “cost-beneﬁ  t” analysis; (3) the veriﬁ  cation of 
compliance with the conditions described in the policy; and
Principle 4: Supplier’s choice and continuity preservation
The relevant supplier must be chosen with sufﬁ  cient vigilance and prudence. The rationale should take 
into account the ﬁ  nancial situation, reputation, technical capacity and management of the supplier. 
The institution should also examine the adequacy of the supplier’s contingency plan, and challenge it 
according to its own continuity constraints. The necessary precautions should be taken by the institution 
in order to enable an adequate transfer of all outsourced activities to another supplier, or back to itself, 
each time the continuity or quality of performance is compromised.
Principle 5: Service level agreement
A formal written contract or service level agreement must be established. This document should take 
into account all the principles described in the Circular.
Principle 6: Protection
The institution should ensure that all its suppliers’ arrangements in terms of continuity and protection 
are adapted to the nature and size of the outsourced activities, to its own policy, and to the standards 
generally applied in the ﬁ  nancial sector. The institution should ensure in an efﬁ  cient manner that the 
conﬁ  dentiality and integrity of data is guaranteed at all times.
Principle 7: Cascade outsourcing
Cascade outsourcing – and all conditions attached to it – should be speciﬁ  cally addressed in the 
contract signed with the relevant suppliers. According to the materiality of the related “outsourced 
activities”, the institution should ensure compliance with all principles described in the Circular, as well 
as the effectiveness of the internal/external control.
Principle 8: Internal audit and compliance
The scope of the internal audit should encompass the outsourced activities. The outsourcer remains 
fully responsible for the control (qualitatively and quantitatively) of the outsourced activities. Full 
access to all aspects of the outsourced activities should be ensured. The scope of the compliance 
obligation encompasses the outsourced activities.
Principle 9: External audit and prudential control
Full access to outsourced activities should be given at any time.
Principle 10: Application of Belgian law 
Outsourcing may not have any impact on the necessity for the institution to comply with the Belgian 
regulatory and legal framework.41
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RECOMMENDATION 5: SECURITIES LENDING
Securities lending and borrowing (or repurchase 
agreements and other economically equivalent 
transactions) should be encouraged as a method 
for expediting the settlement of securities 
transactions. Barriers that inhibit the practice 
of lending securities for this purpose should be 
removed.
RECOMMENDATION 9:   CSD RISK CONTROLS TO 
ADDRESS PARTICIPANTS’ 
FAILURE TO SETTLE
CSDs that extend intraday credit to participants, 
including CSDs that operate net settlement 
systems, should institute risk controls that, at a 
minimum, ensure timely settlement in the event 
that the participant with the largest payment 
obligation is unable to settle. The most reliable 
set of controls is a combination of collateral 
requirements and limits.
RECOMMENDATION 11:   OPERATIONAL 
RELIABILITY
Sources of operational risk arising in the clearing 
and settlement process should be identiﬁ  ed 
and minimised through the development of 
appropriate systems, controls and procedures. 
Systems should be reliable and secure, and have 
adequate, scalable capacity. Contingency plans 
and backup facilities should be established to 
allow for timely recovery of operations and 
completion of the settlement process.
RECOMMENDATION 12:   PROTECTION OF 
CUSTOMERS’ SECURITIES
Entities holding securities in custody should 
employ accounting practices and safekeeping 
procedures that fully protect customers’ 
securities. It is essential that customers’ 
securities be protected against the claims of a 
custodian’s creditors.
RECOMMENDATION 17: TRANSPARENCY
CSDs and CCPs should provide market 
participants with sufﬁ   cient information for 
t h e m  t o  i d e n t i f y  a n d  e v a l u a t e  a c c u r a t e l y  t h e  
risks and costs associated with using the CSD 
or CCP services.
2   LIST OF CPSS-IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS 
ANALYSED IN THE PAPER42
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